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ABSTRACT

Military coups are the most consequential breakdown of civil-military relations. This dissertation
contributes to the explanation and prediction of coups through three independent quantitative
analyses. First, I argue that food insecurity is an important determinant of coups. The presence of
hunger can generate discontent in society and subsequently alter coup plotter opportunities.
Furthermore, I show that the presence of chronic hunger can condition the effect of increasing
development. While increasing levels of development have been shown to limit coup proclivity,
a state experiencing chronic hunger will recognize the fundamental failure of basic needs
provision. As development increases, the presence of chronic hunger in a state will therefore
increase the likelihood of a coup when compared to its absence. Findings indicate that food
insecurity, and specifically the conditioning influence of chronic hunger, are important
explanatory predictors of coups. In the second analysis, I argue that existing tests of the CoupContagion hypothesis have not been sensitive to the specific pathways through which coups may
diffuse. After a robust analysis of spatial autocorrelation, I derive a novel feature of contagion
that is sensitive to both shocks and historical legacy of neighborhood coups. Regression models
including coup contagion as a predictor, provide substantive support for my hypotheses. In the
final assessment, I synthesize explanatory models and provide a machine learning framework to
forecast coups. This framework builds on a growing effort in social science to predict episodes of
political instability. I leverage a rolling origin technique for cross-validation, sequential feature
selection, and an ensemble voting classifier to provide forecasts for coups at the yearly level. I
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find that predictive sensitivity to coups is increasing over time using these methods and can
result in practical forecasts for policy makers.
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To my Grandfather,
Captain Eddie
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The military coup d’état is the most substantial collapse in civil-military relations. This
dissertation develops theoretical links between food insecurity and spatial determinants. I draw
on a rationalist coup plotter paradigm to situate explanatory variables of coup d’état. These novel
contributions are further leveraged in an ensemble machine learning framework to supplement
explanation with prediction. This culminates in a substantive effort to model coups using both
explanatory and forecasting methodologies.
Hunger is a ubiquitous force in the annals of political instability. It is a feeling that can
lead collectives toward huge social change. Momentous ends to French (1789) and Russian
(1917) monarchies were ignited by starvation. Revolutionary change is an easily identifiable
form of political instability, but in the modern state system it is very rare. Of the 317 irregular
leader changes identified by Archigos dataset, over 200 of those events were coups. Food
insecurity is often linked to revolution and its antecedents (protest, riots, etc.), but rarely the
comparatively frequent Coup d’état. Are military elites insulated from the effects of hunger? In
chapter 2, I examine the relationship of food supply and prices towards coups. I draw on a theory
of entitlement failure to identify why a coup plotter may alter their calculus as a result of
deprivation. Results indicate that food insecurity is an important determinant for the prevalence
of coups. Furthermore, the presence of chronic hunger increases the probability of a coup as
development increases, relative to its absence. This relationship is extended directly to military
elite by utilizing measurements for their endowments. As wealth increases, the failure to meet
1

basic needs by the state will increase discontent. This conditional relationship increases the
overall explanation of coups.
In chapter 3, I explore the concept of contagious neighborhoods and how the coup event
itself exhibits diffusive characteristics among military elites within their networks. Existing work
has largely focused on the shock effect of coups. I contend that a historical measure of coup
prevalence is more informative as a measure of innovation-familiarity. Perception of exogenous
coups can provide information regarding both process and post-coup outcomes. A thorough test
of spatial autocorrelation is used to demonstrate the clustering characteristics of coups. This
lends credence to a renewed test of the contagion-hypothesis across a range of neighborhoods. I
find strong support for a substantive effect for coup diffusion. These two novel theoretical
contributions lead to a computationally intense framework for coup forecasting.
The quantitative study of coups has benefited from immense explanatory research, but
less so with regard to prediction. In chapter 4, I present a systematic framework for modeling
coups utilizing a machine learning ensemble approach. Forecasts are assessed at the country
level with yearly temporal resolutions. I outline a methodology that covers feature identification,
processing and selection, model development and deployment, and finally metrics for assessing
the predictive capacity. Forecasts indicate that in 2020 the five most likely countries for a
military coup include Thailand, Tunisia, Somalia, Burundi and Ethiopia. The primary focus of
this paper is to establish a baseline process, and metric, for assessing predictions regarding coups
going forward.
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CHAPTER TWO: THEM BELLY FULL BUT WE HUNGRY

Introduction

Recent coups in Niger (2010) and Sudan (2019) arose during periods of extreme food
insecurity. A famine in the Sahel was brought on by floods in 2009 and subsequent extreme heat
waves. Niger was particularly devastated with reports of almost half of the population in need of
aid (Vogel, 2010). Opposition leader Mariama Gamatié stated “We are in the middle of a
famine” (Constitution crisis turned coup, 2010). The situation in Sudan was similar, as most of
the country was considered either stressed or in crisis according to the Famine Early Warning
System (Sudan - Food Security Outlook). As food insecurity worsened, protests emerged with
calls for the fall of the al-Bashir regime (Protests Grow in Sudan, and So Do Calls for President
to Resign, 2019). The misery resulting from food insecurity in both Niger and Sudan was felt by
millions. In both cases military elites overthrew the ruling executives and installed new
governments.
Beyond these cases the question remains, does food insecurity influence coup-plotters?
As defined by the 1996 World Food Summit “Food security exists when all people at all times
have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, World Food Summit: Rome
Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action, 1996). A person
who is food insecure can face a range of hardships related to health such as malnutrition, growth
stunting, and in extreme cases death from starvation. A hungry population can turn angry or even
3

violent. Coups are unique in that they are predominantly conducted by military elites, a group
which is less likely to personally experience food insecurity. I argue that food insecurity can lead
to opportunity changes among military officers due to their direct contact with rank and file
soldiers, and indirectly due to information regarding discontent in the domestic population.
To address the means by which food insecurity can influence coups, I articulate two
pathways through which actors are affected. Soldiers can be directly exposed to food insecurity
which then leads to changed opportunities towards a coup by their commanding officers. Elites
more broadly can also be indirectly influenced by the domestic population’s food insecurity.
Under the indirect pathway information regarding a regime’s durability, maintenance of the
status quo, and public disposition towards the regime, are conveyed to elites. The mechanism for
food insecurity functions in a similar manner to the more often studied poverty and coup
relationship. As food insecurity increases, coups are more likely to precipitate.
Food insecurity is however, fundamentally linked to poverty. These two features are
highly correlated. While both are independently important in modeling coup occurrences,
together they generate additional variation explanation. I argue that the presence of chronic
hunger in a state increases the probability of coups as development increases. This interactive
effect hinges on relative deprivation. At moderate levels of wealth, elites and society see an
increased perception of what is deserved. Food is a basic necessity, and the failure to provide this
sends signals regarding regime weakness and through generated discontent. Coups are more
likely to take place under these conditions.
In order to extend the logic related to chronic hunger and deprivation, I further specify a
conditional effect on military elites. Similar to how elites more broadly would perceive the
4

failure to stem chronic hunger as development increases, so to will military elites as the
endowments on the armed forces increases. Military elites will expect more as they receive
increases personal wealth. As this increase in wealth at the military elite level increases, the
presence of chronic hunger in society will create conditions for increased coup likelihood.
To test the theoretical arguments all instances of coup attempts from 1950 to 2019 are
examined. Determinants are drawn from a variety of sources to model the influence of food
insecurity. Food supply (and its constituent parts), and food prices (disaggregated), comprise the
primary suite of proxies to test the effect of food insecurity. The influence of basic needs
deprivation is proxied by an interaction of Per Capita GDP and the presence of chronic hunger.
This proxy provides information on the relative deprivation and frustration of society. To further
identify the relative deprivation of military elites in particular, I also interact military expenditure
per soldier with the presence of chronic hunger. This work builds on a growing literature in
political consequences of food insecurity (Hendrix & Haggard, 2015; Rezaeedaryakenari,
Landis, & Thies, 2017; Mukherjee & Koren, 2019) and elite motivators of coups (Bell &
Sudduth, 2017; Johnson & Thyne, Squeaky wheels and troop loyalty: How domestic protests
influence coups d'état, 1951--2005, 2018).

Food and Instability

Malthus is a consistent point of origin for discussions on political stability and hunger.
The basic principle is that food supply will not outpace population growth, thus leading to major
political instability (Malthus, 1888). This argument is built around the arithmetic properties of
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food production, and the geometric characteristics of the human population. But the discourse
around food, vulnerability to hunger, and political instability has evolved.
The United Nations asserts that food is a basic human right (Assembly, 1948). People
need food for survival, so it is acutely important to the organization and ordering of individuals
in social groups. However, a model focused exclusively on food production, population and
stability is inadequate. The agricultural revolution brought about an enormous growth in
production, but chronic hunger did not have the expected decrease. Famine (mass starvation) in
Bangladesh for instance, occurred during a period which was characterized by a surplus of food
supply (Sen, 1982). This case highlights a glaring weakness in the Malthusian model, the
prevalence of hunger and starvation is not just a function of food production, but the means to
access it.
The work of Amartya Sen forced a new conceptual model of hunger and its correlates.
This culminated in a discourse which is broadly construed as food security. As previously
defined, food security includes aspects of economic access and physical supply (FAO, World
Food Summit: Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of
Action, 1996). A key change from the original food supply focused arguments, is what Sen
labels a “failure of entitlements” (Sen, 1982). This failure occurs when a person is unable to
attain the necessary sustenance, even when it is available. Entitlement failure can be witnessed at
local and state levels, as states may also fail to attain the necessary food from an international
market (Friedmann, 1982).
Entitlement failure can emerge in a variety of ways. An individual who loses their job
and no longer has the means of earning wages, loses the ability of purchasing nutrition. This
6

results in hunger. An individual that does not lose their job may also witness an entitlement
failure. If food prices rise but workers do not see an increase in wages, they become priced out of
sustenance. In both scenarios, entitlement failures lead to the potential for hunger and at its worst
even starvation unto death. Famines can decimate countries killing thousands or even millions of
people.
Food prices are an important proxy to understanding political stability outcomes. The
shock associated with food price increases and the subsequent hunger drove mobilization
towards social revolutions across Europe in 1848 (Berger & Spoerer, 2001). Wheat prices were
particularly important for explaining where revolutions would take place. Food insecurity
catalyzed people to mobilize. A social revolution is quite a significant change in the political
system. Food insecurity can result in less extreme outcomes.
Riots and protests are another outcome significantly linked to food insecurity. High food
price can lead to riots (Walton & Seddon, 2008), The effects of food insecurity on riot onset may
be altered by conditions such as poverty and regime. In the 2007-2008 African riots more
repressive regimes under equal levels of food insecurity had more riots (Berazneva & Lee,
2013). This runs counter to arguments regarding the amplifying effect open regimes have on the
logic behind protesting during periods of food insecurity (Hendrix & Haggard, 2015). The later
study was tested across a global sample, which may better consolidate the difference in findings.
Food insecurity can also lead to conflict. Climatic links to conflict are a burgeoning field
(Koubi, 2019). Pathways that link climate change to conflict typically institute a food insecurity
mechanism. Rainfall is linked to the production of food and argued as a mechanism for conflict.
Since food is inherently a resource, reduction of its supply can lead to an increase in conflict
7

(Homer-Dixon, 2010). Local villages are a primary source of such resources for insurgent
groups. During periods of food insecurity, non-combatants can be subject to increased
victimization (Rezaeedaryakenari, Landis, & Thies, 2017).
Whether conflict, public unrest, or revolution, food insecurity is a motivating factor for
instability. It is often linked inextricably to poverty of various forms. And yet, no link between
food insecurity and military coups have been argued. Food insecurity is clearly linked to various
forms of social unrest (Bush, 2010), a prominent antecedent of military coups (Johnson &
Thyne, Squeaky wheels and troop loyalty: How domestic protests influence coups d'état, 1951-2005, 2018). Similarly, while the climate-conflict nexus is widely articulated, a pathway towards
coups in particular is lacking. Conflict however, has been shown to be an important determinant
for elite preferences (Bell & Sudduth, 2017). The gap lends itself to further identification of coup
determinants.

Pathways for Coup Plotters

Coups are the most significant breakdown in civil-military relations. These events can
lead to a variety of trajectories including democratization or autocratic entrenchment.
Understanding the determinants of coups helps in broader studies of political stability. Powell
and Thyne provide a succinct definition for the minimum coup attempt threshold being “illegal
and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting
executive” (Powell & Thyne, 2011, p. 252). Military elites typically play a pivotal role in coups
as the primary actors. Based on the definition of coup d'état, it is possible to theorize the
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motivation of the actors involved in these events. Scholars have typically situated these
determinants within a rationalist coup-plotter framework (Finer, 1988; Thyne, 2010; Powell J. ,
2012; Bell & Sudduth, 2017). As such soldiers have certain preferences regarding the act of
attempting to unseat the executive. A soldier's ability to successfully perform a coup make up
one axis with the other being their disposition or desire to initiate an attempt. Together these two
forms a vector of total preference towards executing a putsch. Food insecurity can influence the
preferences along the ability-axis similar to how economic indicators work as proxies for public
disposition (Kim, 2016). I posit food insecurity acts as a motivator for military elites, altering
their ability to undertake the coup.
Coups are predominantly orchestrated by military elites.1 Higher ranking officers are
however more likely insulated from the effects of chronic hunger. As Kandeh states “The general
has more in common with a government minister, bureaucratic or wealthy businessman than with
subaltern ranks" (2004, 20). With greater rank and responsibility also comes more financial
stability. Personal starvation is less likely to directly lead a general to undertake a putsch. I argue
that hunger can affect coup probabilities along two potential pathways. Hunger can affect the
enlisted soldiers directly under a general officer's rank. This direct effect of soldiers can lead to a
change in an officer’s decision-making calculus thereby increasing opportunity for military elites
to perform a coup. The second manner hunger can theoretically coup outcomes is along an
indirect pathway. Indirectly military and civilian elites can witness the misery caused by mass
starvation. Pervasive hunger throughout the country can send signals regarding the regime’s

1

Ohl and Finkel find that more than 80% of coups are initiated by company grade officers or higher (Ohl & Finkel,
2014, p. 11).
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durability and maintenance of the status quo, and also the mood of society. Elites update their
preferences as a response to this information.

Directly

A soldier in combat needs food and ammunition. When soldiers of the Republic of Sierra
Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) were fighting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) incursion,
they had little of either. The 1992 coup in Sierra Leone was precipitated by years of institutional
and economic degradation due to corruption and patron-client practices of the ruling elite (ZackWilliams & Riley, 1993). After Siaka Stevens’ dominant party rule was transferred to Joseph
Momoh, the country began a free-fall into economic instability. Momoh attempted to institute a
shift in economic and political standards framed as the new order, but the country collapsed into
debt. Combine this economic instability with a civil insurgency, and Sen’s entitlement failure is
apparent.
Soldiers in the Cobra and Tiger units were fighting a difficult war in eastern Sierra Leone
against the RUF. They had limited rations and little monetary incentive to fight the RUF
incursion (Dwyer, 2018, p. 111). This culminated in a group of soldiers with severe grievances
towards the existing regime. At the time, Sierra Leone had an average per person caloric food
supply under the minimum 2100 calories needed to avoid minimum huger requirements.2 Even at
2100 calories per person, a soldier’s nutrition would be stressed given the high energy needs

2

1950 and 1991 kilocalories per capita the previous two years.

10

required for armed combat. This measure is aggregated to the country level, and so soldiers on
the front would likely have experienced an even greater degree of food insecurity.
The grievances continued to grow until a tipping point was reached. Soldiers were so
angry that they agreed to mutiny against the existing regime (Dwyer, 2018, p. 111). Interviews
afterward indicate that while officers had been planning a coup, soldiers were only informed of
the collective's mutinous intentions. Captain Valentine Strasser and other officers utilized the
soldier’s grievances over food insecurity to secure their loyalty in insurrection. Food insecurity
was only one of the problems facing both soldiers and the country at large. In this case however
it was a primary motivating factor behind the rank and file soldiers’ grievances. When soldiers
got to the capital it wasn’t until they approached the State House when the officers informed
them that the ration-mutiny would actually be an attack on the government (Dwyer, 2018, p.
113). The mutiny evolved into a coup, per the officer’s plans, and Sierra Leone witnessed a
regime change. Reports afterwards confirmed the soldier's underlying motivation that “Momoh
had failed to pay them or give them enough food or ammunition” (Troops Seize Power in Sierra
Leone, 1992).
The case of Sierra Leone and Captain Valentine Strasser, illustrates the potential that
hunger can directly influence soldier’s opportunity to perform a coup. While the officers of the
Tiger and Cobra units may have been formulating plans for a military coup for some time
(Dwyer, 2018, p. 110), grievances centered around hunger sparked the insurrection. This
demonstrates the potential for a direct effect of food insecurity on coup-plotter behavior. Food
insecurity led to increased loyalty and granted the opportunity for officers in Sierra Leone to
leverage that group cohesion into an attempt on the executive.
11

Indirectly

Misery precipitated by pervasive hunger may also indirectly affect elite's opportunity to
form a coup. Similar to more general poverty, food insecurity affects the general population first,
and foremost. It is the most vulnerable members of society who bear the brunt of famines and
food price spikes. The most research has been done not only on the outcomes related to the
population specifically (further impoverishment (De Waal & Waal, 1997), and death (Sen,
1982)), but also behavior changes such as general social unrest (Bush, 2010). When a society is
starving, it sends a number of important signals. Hunger can indicate a legitimacy crisis, regime
weakness, and impending changes to the status quo. All of these signals are correlated and
influence elite preferences.
A country where people are starving has a legitimacy problem. By legitimacy here, I refer
to the “capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political
institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” (Lipset, 1959, p. 86). Chronic
hunger can lead to a general belief that the country is witnessing a legitimacy crisis. Under such
conditions a revolution from below threatens the existing political order. Rather than allow this
change, a coup may be a preemptive attempt to stymie it. In a similar theoretical vein, coups may
be an extreme response to economic hardship (O'Kane, 1981). Rampant food insecurity
functions in a consistent manner. State’s that witness food insecurity are in a state of flux. Coups
can be a reaction to this hardship. A crisis of legitimacy coincides with inherent weakness in the
current regime.

12

As famines ravage a state and misery becomes rampant, political institutions are strained.
A state that is unable to quell hunger, is one that is primed for instability. The regime’s survival
is important to consider under such circumstances. For instance, a drastic surge in food prices
had an important effect on the social revolutions of 1848 (Berger & Spoerer, 2001). The collapse
of French and Russian monarchies were also sparked by episodes of food insecurity. Hunger
creates an environment where the tenure of an existing regime begins to be unstable. Coups can
be a response to discontent and efforts to stave off the more radical change brought on by a
revolution. One observable behavior that further demonstrates this link is the presence of social
unrest.
Food insecurity correlates with various forms of social unrest. Protests, particularly in
open political systems where concessions are more plausible, increase when there are shocks to
global food prices (Hendrix & Haggard, 2015). Riots exhibit similar tendencies (Walton &
Seddon, 2008). Although food allocation is dictated by an international market (Friedmann,
1982), the population of a given state has a more narrow focus when faced with starvation. It’s
simpler to attribute the hardships of hunger to the state one resides in (Grobler, 2016). The
culmination of food insecurity into various forms of social unrest and general displeasure
towards an existing regime alters elite opportunities. One consideration in a coup-plotter’s
decision calculus is whether the domestic population will agree or concede to a regime change.
The social unrest pre-regime change, indicates that the population will be more accepting of the
coup (Galetovic & Sanhueza, 2000). As Kim states “Coup plotters utilize observable economic
and social factors to assess the likelihood that a coup will be successful and to update their
beliefs about the regime’s strength and popularity” (Kim, 2016, p. 4).
13

The falling legitimacy and social unrest resulting from food insecurity sends a signal
regarding the situation in a state. The status quo is under imminent threat. Elites hold an elevated
position in a state. Scholars have found that the military, and particularly military elites, have
corporate interests (Nordlinger, 1977; Thompson, 1973). A central corporate interest is survival.
The military is aware when the status quo of a country is being strained by social unrest and
legitimacy crises. Rather than allow conditions to grow into an untenable outcome, the military
may act to ensure their survival, even if that includes stifling civil unrest (Svolik, 2012). Food
insecurity can lead military elites to have greater considerations regarding their survival. This
leads to a change in decision calculus toward initiating a coup.
In summation food insecurity can influence a coup plotters calculus towards a coup. It
can do so directly when rank and file soldiers experience hunger, thereby increasing loyalty to
commanding officers. Officers can leverage this increased loyalty to initiate a coup. Food
insecurity also indirectly signals the regime’s legitimacy and durability, as well as the public’s
general disposition. Elites more generally will have to take preemptive action to ensure that the
status quo is maintained. Through these pathways I expect the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Food insecurity will increase the likelihood of a coup.

This hypothesis indicates a linear relationship between food insecurity and coups. As a
country experiences increased hunger due to either supply, access or prices, the likelihood a coup
event takes place increases. I do not expect that food insecurity has an important differentiating
effect on the propensity for a coup to succeed. Instead the theoretical mechanism points
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specifically to the occurrence of a coup event both failed and successful. Food insecurity does
function in a similar manner to measures of poverty. It is also highly correlated, and in many
ways endogenous (De Waal & Waal, 1997). However, food insecurity captures a unique
characteristic of society that differentiates it from wealth measures. As poverty decreases the
expectation is that coup probability displays a consistent downward trajectory. I argue however
that instances of chronic hunger condition the expectation and generate altered coup
probabilities. This argument is based on the theory of basic needs deprivation and relative
expectations.

Chronic Hunger

Food insecurity is closely related to measures of income inequality. Food insecurity is
often not just about the production but vulnerability to hunger. Per Capita GDP and Per Capita
food supply are correlated at .73. Findings regarding inequality and coups are consistent, as
inequality increases the probability of a coup rises. Expectations outlined regarding food
insecurity are consistent with this as well. As food insecurity increases, coups are more likely to
occur. These two variables function similarly, however societal expectations change when food
insecurity is particularly intense.
Chronic hunger is defined as the consumption of fewer than 1800 kilocalories per person,
per day (FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010, Addressing food insecurity in
protracted crises, 2010). This degree of hunger is extreme and represents a fundamental crisis in
society. When food insecurity is so pervasive as to reach this level, it creates misery and
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frustration at all levels of society. Western Africa is a region that has a long history of chronic
hunger. For instance, Ghana “had often suffered from drought; their situation was serious, with
worsening malnutrition among children and other normal consequences of drought, in 1977”
(Derrick, 1984, p. 285). This sort of degradation within society creates frustration and discontent.
Food insecurity and poverty are linked. Often times when one is present, the other is as
well. But these features vary and are not perfectly correlated. While development is something
that a country will attempt further, it is not a necessity in the same sense that food is. As King
articulates basic necessities include, “minimum levels of nutrition, shelters, and education”
(King, 1998, p. 385). The provision of satisfactory levels of nutrition to stave off chronic hunger
is a basic necessity. When this is not present it provides the conditions which frustration and
discontent will increase.
At its core, this is an argument of relative deprivation. Those who perceive their lot
below what they deserve are motivated to action (Gurr, 1968). GDP Per capita is a proxy for
development, and at low levels society’s expected needs are dampened. As development
increases however, expectations for basic needs are much higher. A population plagued by
chronic hunger represents a failure of the most basic of human needs. This is also referred to as
Regressive Socioeconomic Distribution (Reenock, Bernhard, & Sobek, 2007).
What happens when a country that has some degree of development or wealth, also
witnesses a failure to provide basic needs? This was the case for Nigeria during the early 1980’s.
Nigeria witnessed an oil boom from the early 1970’s until 1983. During this period, it saw huge
economic growth. Much of this growth was wrought from oil exports, and the revenues were
generally controlled by the state. While development and wealth were growing, food insecurity
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was also rising. In fact, the two were linked in many ways according to Collier; “because of the
influx of foreign exchange the oil boom raised food prices and reduced non-food agricultural
production” (1988, p. 774).
In 1983, Nigeria reached a tipping point. FAO’s statistic for food supply per person that
year fell to just 1726 kilocalories. Chronic hunger was present. Corruption was rampant and
lauded as a motivating factor behind the coup (Diamond, 1984). With oil revenues society was
frustrated with the current state of the country. More particularly though one of the coup
participants Major General Babatunde Idiagbon stated post-coup: “our priority is the welfare of
the common man. It is more relevant to us that the prices of foodstuffs and other essential
commodities are within the reach of the ordinary man than…” (Hutchful, 1986, p. 805). Coup
leader General Buhari, made similar statements suggesting that food aid was needed (Derrick,
1984, p. 287).
The case of Nigeria in 1983 exhibits the conditional effect which chronic hunger has on a
society at higher levels of development. Nigeria was above average in GDP per capita, and the
oil boom did have a significant impact on economic growth and development. But the presence
of chronic hunger is a failure of the state to meet basic needs. The coup arose from a failure of
the state to meet those needs. Elites within the military saw a need to take control of the
executive in order to alleviate the pervasive issue of extreme food insecurity. This case leads to
my second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2a: As economic development increases, chronic hunger will increase the likelihood
of a coup.
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Since military elites are the actors most often involved in coup attempts, it would be
logically consistent to extend this argument of relative expectations more directly. The
endowments received by military personnel should function in a consistent fashion to
development at the state level. Huntington suggests granting material and economic support to
the military to insulate the regime from intervention (Huntington, 1991). As officers see an
increase in compensation however, they would also have an increased expectation for needs
provision. If chronic hunger is present, even in a military that has relative more expenditure at
the per soldier level, the likelihood of a coup is increased.
Ghana was a country which while not wealthy had a moderate level of expenditure on it’s
armed forces in the late 1970’s. As Huntington argues, the increased economic support Ghanaian
soldiers had should have insulated the regime from attempts to unseat it. However, Ghana was in
a volatile position regarding its people’s food security. Hunger was pervasive and extended “well
outside the normal drought belt” (Derrick, 1984, p. 285). FAO has Ghana as witnessing chronic
hunger in every year from 1977 until 1984. During this time, the country had seven coup events
(4 failures and 3 successes). Intra-military disagreements fueled the early coups, however coups
in 1979 and 1981 were centered around military corruption and alleviating food insecurities
(Onwumechili & Carle, 1998, pp. 47-48). Coup leader Jerry Rawlings stated; “I am neither a
capitalist or a communist, but I know how it is to be hungry” (Hutchful, 1986, p. 805).
As militaries are compensated more, it does broadly insulate the regime from attempts on
the executive. The presence of chronic hunger, however, indicates a failure of the state to meet
basic needs. This was the case in Ghana and the harsh repercussion for military officers post18

1979 coup on corruption charges further depicts this relationship. This leads to an alternative
hypothesis that identifies the conditional effect more specifically at the military soldier level.

Hypothesis 2b: As per capita military expenditure increases, chronic hunger will increase the
likelihood of a coup.

Design

The theoretical arguments being tested are concerned with food insecurity’s effect on
military elite preferences towards a coup d'état. For this reason I utilize the data constructed by
Powell and Thyne on global instances of coups (Powell & Thyne, Global instances of coups
from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset, 2011). This data set has all instances from 1950 until present.
In the full data set coups, including attempts, take place in just under 4% of all country-years.
The limited nature of many predictors restricts the full sample from 1950-2019 to a series of
subsets to be discussed in feature sections. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for the
presence of a coup in a country-year. Due to this, I utilize a logistic regression.
Food security is a multi-featured concept. Approximations have included “agricultural
production, livestock holdings, landholdings, multiple income sources that typically generate
varied amounts of income, daily food consumption in terms of quantity and diversity, local food
prices, anthropometric measurements of children under five (to assess wasting and stunting), and
the degree to which households rely on coping strategies, such as wild plant consumption,
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seasonal migration and wage labor, and asset liquidation” (Baro & Deubel, 2006, p. 526). This
paper seeks to specifically uncover the relationship between hunger and military elite preferences
towards a coup. While elites may not feel the direct effects of hunger, their immediate
environment (enlisted soldiers and general population) will. The best measure of food
(in)security would comprise a state's food availability and entitlement across its population.
Food availability is the presence of sufficient production to meet the demands of a population.
Food entitlement refers to the ability of its people to attain food through economic means.
Given the first hypothesis regarding food insecurity, two measures will be used as best
primary and alternative proxies: food supply and food price. Both of these measures indicate
components of food insecurity and represent best approximations given data availability. Since
food prices are limited in state-level coverage, I choose to use food supply as the primary proxy
for food insecurity. Both food price and food supply have a number of component parts that
make up the measure and so I report models showing the indicators disaggregated in the
APPENDIX A: FOOD INSECURITY AND COUPS.

Food Supply

Food supply is the dimension of food security concerned with the physical availability of
sustenance. Food supply is an important indicator in that it measures variation across states in
how many calories per day are available on average. While this measure does account for things
such as imports/exports, production and existing food stocks, it does not account for the waste at
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individual levels (Faostat, 2019). For this reason, it is probably higher than the actual amount of
food consumed per person.
Food is a basic necessity (Wimberley & Bello, 1992; Jenkins & Scanlan, 2001; Reenock,
Bernhard, & Sobek, 2007), and an adequate supply is an expected responsibility of the state.
Food supply is also useful in that it does not suffer from the unequal distribution issues found in
measures such as GDP per capita (Streeten, Burki, Haq, Hicks, & Stewart, 1981). When the
average supply increases it is not a result of increasing wealth concentration in the upper quartile,
but instead a meaningful increase for the typical citizen. Wealthy citizens choose to change food
types (typically more expensive appetites), rather than increasing caloric intake (Subramanian &
Deaton, 1996). This elasticity creates a measure with a natural ceiling and a distribution that
better reflects the context of actual food supply.
The measure for food supply comes from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAOStat) website (Faostat, 2019). The food balance sheets provide a number of
measures which include the total food imported, exported, and various utilizations (animal feed,
biofuels, waste, etc.). The per person food supply measure is calculated by finding the resulting
excess of food3 and averaging it across the population. Food supply is thus measured in daily
per-person, kilocalories. The data provided is limited to the years 1961 - 2017 across 170
countries.

3

Food supply is equal to the production plus the imports plus changes in stock minus exports and wastage. The food
type is then converted to caloric units and divided by the total population at the daily level.
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Figure 1 – Food Supply and Coups

Within this sample coups occur in 282 country-years which is still just under 4% of all
observations at the unit of analysis level. The average food supply in country-years experiencing
a coup is 2200 as compared to 2600 in those years without an attempt. Food supply ranges from
3828 cal/per-person/per-day in the United States 2005, down to Burkina Faso 1962 which had an
average food supply of just 1308 calories. Figure 1 – Food Supply and Coups bins the food
supply measure into four equal quartiles4 and illustrates how many country-years witnessed coup
events in each. It is descriptively apparent that as food supply increases, the number of coups
decreases drastically. In order to ensure that food supply is not endogenous with political

4

1308-2180, 2181-2535, 2536-3016, 3017-3828 cal/per-person/per-day
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instability from coups, I lag the variable by a year. Additionally, given the distribution of the
measure it is logged to ensure stable parameter estimation.

Food Price
The second portion of the food security definition is the economic power to acquire food.
Related to this is the price of food. Holding income constant when food prices rise individuals
have less access to food. Food prices are not set internally by states, although they can be
subsidized, and as a result prices can be influenced by a variety of factors. Drought, floods,
natural disaster, and shifting markets can all influence the price of food. Locally food insecure
communities can be subject to global market trends.
The long-term real commodity prices measures come from David Jacks work on real
commodity prices (Jacks, 2019). The prices of tea, sugar, peanuts, palm oil, coffee, cocoa, wheat,
rye, rice, corn, barley, pork, beef, and lamb are all accounted for in the years 1850-2018. While
commodities such as rice and wheat have generally decreased in price since 1950, meat proteins
such as beef and lamb have increased significantly. Figure 2 – Food Prices and Coups illustrates
the price trends of tea and wheat over time and also the number of coups that occurred in each
year.
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Figure 2 – Food Prices and Coups

Hypothesis 1 asserts that food insecurity has a direct effect on the likelihood a coup takes
place. The two measures of food insecurity (supply and price) have varying degrees of
specificity. Food supply is measured at the country-year level and food prices are measured at
the yearly level. The base model of food supply is logically coherent as it represents a direct link
between a country’s domestic per capita caloric food supply and the pathways through which it
can affect coup outcomes. Although food prices are not specific to the country and instead
represent a global market price, they do still capture the broad trends of food insecurity.
Additionally, Figure 23 in the Appendix displays the correlations between all measures of food
insecurity.

24

Figure 3 – Food Supply and GDP

Hypothesis 2a places focus on how food insecurity, and in particular chronic hunger, can
help explain coup proclivity as economic development increases. I follow the expectations laid
out by relative deprivation and regressive socioeconomic distribution (Sayles, 1984; Reenock,
Bernhard, & Sobek, 2007), that higher levels of development will result in a greater awareness of
the basic necessities society deserves. As a country witnesses more development the provision of
basic needs such as food, becomes even more important. As development increases a society that
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experiences chronic hunger is expected to have an increased propensity to coup. For this measure
I use the Penn World Tables measure of Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (Feenstra, Inklaar,
& Timmer, 2015). GDP per capita is also lagged and scaled consistent with food measures to
control for endogeneity. Figure 3 – Food Supply and GDP illustrates the relationship between
food supply and GDP per capita. These two measures are highly correlated. The level of food
supply that represents the threshold for chronic hunger is 1800 calories. Any country that has a
measure under the 1800 per capita supply, is one which is suffering from chronic hunger.
I also utilize Military Expenditure per soldier to test Hypothesis 2b. One means of
appeasing an unruly military is to increase national spending on them (Huntington, 1991).
Military expenditure per soldier has been shown to decrease the likelihood of coups in a global
sample (Powell J. , 2012). This interaction has a consistent expectation as that of development.
As members of the military become more personally endowed with wealth, they are likely to
have increased expectations of basic needs. The presence of chronic hunger is expected to
increase the likelihood of a coup as military expenditure increases. I utilize the National Military
Capabilities data which is part of the Correlates of War research project (Singer, Bremer, &
Stuckey, 1972). This data provides information on both the number of military personnel and the
expenditure on the national military. This feature is scaled and lagged for modeling purposes.
Figure 4 – Food Supply and Military Expenditure Per Soldier illustrates the relationship between
food supply and military expenditure per soldier. Again, the level of chronic hunger are those
observations which fall below 1800 calories per person per day.
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Figure 4 – Food Supply and Military Expenditure Per Soldier

For controls I include a measure for the time since the last coup as well as its squared and
cubic polynomials (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998). This has been shown to be an important
indicator for the prevalence of coups and is measured as the number of years since last attempt.
GDP per capita is also controlled for in all models although it correlates with food supply at .73
and p<.001. Military expenditure per soldier is another variable included in models as it has
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shown explanatory power in coup models (Powell J. , 2012). Binary indicators for democracy
(Bell, 2016) and the Cold War period (1960 - 1991) are also included.

Results

Table 1 – Food Supply Primary Results
Coup Attempt
(1)

(2)

(3)

Food Supply (cals) -0.885*** -0.191*
(0.075)

(0.112)
***

Time Since

Cold War

Observations
Pseudo R

2

-0.199*

(0.089)

(0.112)

(0.115)

-0.166

-0.206

-0.171

-0.166***

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.038)

(0.036)

***

***

-0.285

-0.281

-0.286***

(0.102)

(0.111)

(0.101)

Military Exp (ln)
Democracy

(5)

-0.397*** -0.213*

***

GDP pc(ln)

Constant

(4)

**

-0.055

-0.026

(0.044)

(0.054)

-0.001

-0.075

0.032

(0.173)

(0.161)

(0.181)

0.557*** 0.403**

0.59***

(0.161)

(0.174)

(0.157)

-3.579*** -0.158

-1.735*** 0.068

-29.775

(0.08)

(0.827)

(0.427)

(0.926)

(4057937.841)

7726.0

6400.0

6552.0

5673.0

6400.0

0.069

0.144

0.159

0.155

0.173

-948.82

Log Likelihood

-1145.23 -890.16

-821.4

-860.06

AIC

2294.46 1796.32 1913.64 1660.8

1866.12

BIC

2308.36 1850.43 1967.94 1720.59 2359.9
*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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Time Since Splines not shown
Fixed Effects in model 5
I now proceed to a discussion of results of each of the hypotheses. Beginning with
Hypothesis 1, I test the influence of food insecurity on the probability of a coup attempt across a
full sample. I vary the proxy for food insecurity between food supply and food price. Each of
these measures have a number of component parts, so a full survey of results is presented in
APPENDIX A: FOOD INSECURITY AND COUPS.
Table 1 presents a summary of the primary results. Food supply, as measured by a per
capita caloric supply at the country-year level, is a statistically significant predictor across
models. Model 1 displays a bivariate relationship, where food supply has a negative coefficient
and is significant at p<.01. Models 2 - 5 include controls and fixed effects to ensure results are
not a function of omitted variable bias. The inclusion of GDP per capita does mitigate some of
the effect of food supply, pushing it to a level of p<0.1, but it maintains statistical significance.
Time since the last coup is an important predictor and the sign is consistent with literature,
indicating that as a state increases time since a coup it has a reduced probability to witness
another. Cold war is also an important predictor, indicating that coups did cluster during that
period. Military expenditure per soldier does not achieve significance, and neither does whether
a country is a democracy.
GDP per capita is an important predictor across models it is included in. With a negative
coefficient it indicates that as countries increase wealth, they become insulated from coups. This
is also consistent with existing literature. Overall, the models lend support to the hypothesis that
food insecurity is positively related to coup outcomes. As food supply increases, states witness a
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significant decrease in the propensity for a coup. I run a series of additional models where
various components of food supply constitute the proxy for food insecurity.
Table 6 – Food Supply Components 1 through Table 10 – Food Supply Components 5
contain a series of models with food supply components. Each model contains a full host of
controls based on the best fit model metrics above to assess the statistical significance in a most
constrained setting. While many components do not achieve significance, some do. Negative
statistically significant food supply components include plant protein, dairy and eggs, sugar,
dates, apples, and the subcategory other. Positive indicators include lemons and limes, citrusother, pineapples, and fruits other.
First an assessment of the negative indicators. For each of these subcomponents, as the
daily per capita caloric supply provided by each category increases, the country witnesses a
decrease in coup probability. The indicators dairy and eggs, sugar, apples, and other are all
highly correlated with the aggregate measure for food supply (>.5 correlation statistics). While
plant protein is not as highly correlated, it is significant at the p<.05 level. As the amount of plant
protein measured in kilocalories per person per day increases the probability of a coup decreases.
In contrast as the daily caloric supply the average person has in pineapples per day
increases, coups become more likely. This finding may be a function of where pineapples are a
particularly important source of calories. Brazil in particular, parts of central America and
southeast Asia are regions where pineapples are consumed at high levels. These are also regions
that have noticed particularly high levels of coups.
Food supply and its components make up an important aspect of food insecurity. While
some subcomponents exhibit counter-intuitive findings relative to coup propensity, the aggregate
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measure of food supply functions in a theoretically consistent manner. This lends support to the
argument that food insecurity increases military elite preferences towards initiating a coup. I turn
now to the alternative proxy for food insecurity, food prices. This data does not vary but
country-year, but just year. These measures represent a global price of a particular food item in a
given year.
Table 11 – Food Prices 1 through Table 13 – Food Prices 3 contain models of yearly food
price effect on military coups. Each model contains the full range of control variables. Only two
variables are significant predictors for military coups, tea and wheat. Both tea and wheat have
positive coefficients and are significant at p<.1 and p<.05, respectively. Water is the only
beverage that is consumed at higher rates than tea around the world (Tea consumption wby
country | Statista). The positive sign indicates that as the global price of tea increase the potential
to witness a coup grows. While tea is not necessary for survival, its predictive performance may
indicate a general public disposition. When tea prices are high a population may no longer afford
it due to an entitlement failure. Since tea is relatively cheap, unlike more protein rich foods, it
may be a sort of last straw. When even tea is unaffordable a domestic population may be
reaching a tipping point.
The statistical significance of wheat is unsurprising. Wheat is one of the most important
sources of food for particularly lower and middle income countries (WHEAT in the World »
CGIAR Research Program on WHEAT). As the global price of wheat increases, less people are
able to access the source of calorie supply. Consistent with expectation, as food insecurity
increases due to the failure to attain sustenance due to high prices military elites receive
information regarding the domestic attitude and regime durability. While these two food price
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variables were shown to be significant, the rest were not. I turn now to the additional hypotheses
articulated before regarding the interactive effect of chronic hunger.

Conditional Effects of Chronic Hunger

Table 2 – Chronic Hunger Interaction
Coup Attempt
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.4*
-7.5*** -2.779*
(0.214) (1.824) (1.501)
Chronic Hunger * GDP pc(ln)
1.08***
(0.242)
Chronic Hunger * Military Exp (ln)
0.405**
(0.186)
***
***
GDP pc(ln)
-0.357 -0.499 -0.367***
(0.095) (0.102) (0.095)
Military Exp (ln)
-0.033 -0.034 -0.063
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
Time Since
-0.173*** -0.165*** -0.175***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Democracy
0.003
0.074
0.011
(0.181) (0.181) (0.181)
Cold War
0.592*** 0.597*** 0.571***
(0.174) (0.176) (0.174)
Constant
0.829 1.885** 1.149
(0.745) (0.791) (0.755)
Chronic Hunger

Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC

5673.0 5673.0 5673.0
0.155
0.164
0.157
-821.47 -812.44 -819.09
1660.94 1644.88 1658.18
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BIC

1720.73 1711.32 1724.62

Note:

*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Hypothesis 2a deals with the conditional effect chronic hunger. I test two separate
measures to understand the conditional effect. First, I interact chronic hunger with development.
This follows the theoretical arguments of regressive socioeconomic distribution (Reenock,
Bernhard, & Sobek, 2007). The expectation is that as development increases, the presence of
chronic hunger will increase the likelihood of a coup. The logic of relative deprivation suggests
that elites and domestic audiences will have increased expectations of basic needs provision as
development increases. As wealth rises the failure to meet basic needs, and avoid chronic
hunger, will be even greater. The unequal distribution of resources leads to discontent with the
existing regime. With this increased expectation, the state will be more likely to witness a coup if
chronic hunger exists. Results for this hypothesis are found in Table 2 – Chronic Hunger
Interaction.
Model 1 is a baseline model which includes the binary indicator for chronic hunger and
no interaction term. Chronic hunger is a binary indicator for the presence of a food supply below
the 1800 calories per person per day threshold in a country year. In this model chronic hunger is
positive and significant indicating that countries that have chronic hunger are more likely to
witness a coup, but only at p<.1. Model 2 is a test of Hypothesis 2a with the inclusion of the
development interaction, GDP per capita (logged). Chronic hunger sees a flipped sign when the
interaction term is introduced. Alone this indicates that the presence of chronic hunger does not
indicate an increase in coup propensity. However, the interaction terms sign is positive and
significant at p<.01. This model also has a lower AIC and BIC indicating it is a better overall
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model than the first. Including the interaction term increases the estimation of coups. The
positive coefficient for chronic hunger interacted with GDP per capita indicates that as
development increases, the presence of chronic hunger increases the likelihood that a coup
occurs. This finding lends support to the hypothesis. Model 3 is a test of Hypothesis 2b and
includes the interaction of chronic hunger and military expenditure per capita (logged). The
interaction term is significant at p< .05 and is again positive. This finding lends support to the
notion that as military members witness an increase in compensation, they respond to basic
needs deprivation in a harsher manner. As military expenditure increases, the presence of chronic
hunger in a country increases the likelihood that a coup occurs.

Figure 5– Chronic Hunger Marginal Effects
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For simplicity, a marginal effects plot can help to demonstrate the relationship. Figure 5–
Chronic Hunger Marginal Effects displays that as GDP per capita rises countries with chronic
hunger are significantly more likely to witness a coup, when compared to countries that are not.
The mean of GDP per capita is around 8.65, however the confidence intervals around the binary
chronic hunger diverge beginning around 7 and proceeding to just under 10. This is actually
where the bulk of countries tend to fall as can be seen in Figure 3 – Food Supply and GDP. The
graph demonstrates that if a country is undergoing chronic levels of hunger, a military coup is
significantly more likely as development increases. At low levels of GDP per capita, the
confidence intervals overlap. This indicates that the interaction does not substantively distinguish
a change in predicted probability at such levels of poverty. Substantively, the effects indicate that
the between roughly 7 and 10 logged GDP per capita, the presence of chronic hunger results in a
2-3% increased probability of coup d’état.
Figure 5– Chronic Hunger Marginal Effects also illustrates the marginal effects of logged
military expenditure per soldier. A similar trend emerges to that of development. At higher
levels of military expenditure per soldier, the confidence intervals for chronic hunger diverge.
At low levels of military expenditure per soldier, coup probability is higher for states not
suffering from chronic hunger. A look back at Figure 4 – Food Supply and Military Expenditure
Per Soldier shows that the actual number of observations below the point of divergence (7.5)
represents a very small proportion of the total number of observations (roughly 16%). As
military expenditure passes beyond this point however, chronic hunger increases the probability
of a coup event. For instance, at the mean of military expenditure per soldier (8.9) the presence
of chronic hunger increases the likelihood of a coup by more than 3%. These figures and the
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models containing interactions lend support to both hypothesis 2a and 2b. As development and
endowments increase, the increased frustration from chronic hunger helps to explain the
increased likelihood of a coup.

Discussion

The relationship between food, people, and stability is one dated back as far as political
collectives have existed. Competition over resources and impending scarcity form a backbone of
Malthusian (1888), and neo-Malthusian thought (Kaplan, 1994). Emperor Tiberius knew well
the importance of maintaining the granary to keep a stable climate within the Roman state
(Rickman, 1980). And yet, the relationship between food insecurity and coups has until now, not
been tested on a global sample. This research has articulated two pathways through which food
insecurity can affect elites capable of a putsch. I find that the measure for food supply has an
important effect on the likelihood of coups. The aggregate food supply is a measure estimates the
individual level of food available on a daily basis. The availability of food has always been
linked to forms of instability, but it now has a stronger theoretical footing in the rationalist coupplotter framework. Elites can receive information regarding food insecurity directly from rank
and file soldiers, or indirectly from the hunger found in the population.
Previous work has made clear the inextricable linkages between food insecurity and
poverty (Sen, 1982). Moving beyond the inclusion of food insecurity as a valuable predictor for
coups, I find a conditional relationship for the impact chronic hunger has on a society. The
relationship builds on previous work regarding the effect of state-level failures to meet basic
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needs as development increases (Reenock, Bernhard, & Sobek, 2007). As development
increases, a state that has chronic hunger sees a significant increase in the likelihood of a coup.
The failure to meet basic needs creates frustration among society, and elites. Development acts
as a proxy for the degree to which that frustration is amplified. Increasing development will
increase the relative expectations of society. Chronic hunger is a failure that is met with extreme
frustration by society and elites.
In an effort to extend the logic behind a conditional effect of chronic hunger further, I
specify a relationship directly with military elites. Military elites are typically the primary actors
involved in coups. The relative frustration this group feels should also see an increase as personal
endowments increase. Chronic hunger has a consistent conditional effect on the per capita
expenditure of military personnel. As military personnel see increased personal wealth, the
presence of chronic hunger within a state has a significant positive influence on the probability a
coup occurs. This finding goes to further specify the important effects food insecurity more
broadly have on the likelihood of a coup.
This paper finds robust support for both a direct link between food insecurity and coups,
and a conditional effect of chronic hunger. The inclusion of food insecurity indicators increases
the predictive power of coup models. Practically, policy makers need to be aware of the
implications that food insecurity has on coup proclivity. Recent coups in both Niger and Sudan
occurred during periods of. People in both countries were feeling the effects of famine and while
international efforts to combat hunger were present, internal instability faltered. Famine has
found significant attention in policy domains related to conflict and migration. This study helps
to show the value of incorporating various aspects of food insecurity in models of coups.
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Further research in this domain is still needed. First, while the measure used for food
supply has an advantage in how it represents the general population rather than being subject to
over concentration by an upper elite, it remains imperfect. Aggregated food insecurity measures
are at best, broad proxies and still leave variation at group or actor levels unexplained. The
availability of food at group-levels would increase our understanding of how food insecurity
influences coups.
Finally, scholars could do more to understand how climatic conditions are influencing
this relationship. Some efforts have attempted to test these relationships (Smirnov, Steinwand,
Xiao, & Zhang, 2018), but further investigations are warranted. The presence of military actors
that maintain ties with agriculturally dependent populations will be of particular interest in this
research domain. By identifying cash and subsistence crops and matching with temperature and
rainfall growth thresholds, scholars can identify not only the most vulnerable groups but the
military elites most likely to feel a change in preference towards the regime.
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CHAPTER THREE: COUPS AND INNOVATION DIFFUSION

Introduction

Tobler's first law of geography states that “everything is related to everything else, but
near things are more related than distant things” (Tobler, 1970, p. 236). When Jerry Rawlings
stated his intention to alleviate Ghanaian issues ‘the Ethiopian way’, and the apparent emulation
that followed in Burkina Faso (Hutchful, 1986, pp. 812-813), Tobler's mechanism is at play.
Research on the determinants of military intervention have been conducted for more than half-acentury, but do coups, failed and successful, in one state impact the likelihood of coups in a
neighbor? I argue that in order to better adjudicate the question of contagion, a rigorous spatial
approach and a nuanced operationalization of diffusion is needed. A variety of tests for spatial
autocorrelation are conducted to inform hypothesis testing. Findings support the novel contagion
measure through regression analysis of global instances of coups.
Theoretically this paper makes an important contribution to the coup contagion
scholarship by conceptualizing a more plausible pathway. Whereas existing studies have focused
on the temporally imminent coup outcome, I argue that putsch diffusion should focus on
vulnerability. Coups exhibit diffusive characteristics through the combination of immediate
shocks and historical legacy, of coups in a given neighborhood. Existing innovation diffusion
literature has illustrated how spread can be mitigated or exacerbated due to characteristics of the
innovation, actors involved, and environment. Drawing on this work, I utilize these
characteristics to form a theoretically grounded and novel operationalization of coup contagion.
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Empirically two major contributions to existing research on coup contagion are provided.
First, I conduct the most robust test of coup d'état spatial autocorrelation to date. This includes
using thousands of temporal and geographical aggregations and the full set of spatial weight
matrix configurations with a corresponding parameter sweep. This empirical approach is strictly
intended to answer the question; are coups spatially autocorrelated? Results indicate exhaustively
that coups exhibit positive spatial autocorrelation. These findings lend credence to a reexamination of the coup contagion hypothesis in regression analysis.
A unique measure for coup diffusion is developed that is sensitive to both shocks and the
historical legacy of coups in a neighborhood. The second empirical contribution is the utilization
of new spatial lags as a regressor for coup occurrences. Similar to efforts in assessing spatial
autocorrelation, I run a full set of possible operationalizations of spatial weight matrices in order
to assess the robustness of the measure. Results demonstrate the practical usefulness of
contagious features in modeling coups. Coup contagion measures are significant and powerful
explanatory predictors for coups.
What follows is a discussion on the extant coup contagion literature. I then outline a how
characteristics of coups can influence pathways of diffusion and how to accomplish a
theoretically plausible operationalization. The empirical section is separated into two primary
parts. First, a review of spatial autocorrelation methods and the variety of aggregations to coup
data needed to ensure an exhaustive test of clustering. This is followed by an implementation of
spatial lag regression modeling utilizing a novel diffusion operationalization. Finally, I conclude
with a practical discussion of contagion at the elite level.
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Previous Coup-Contagion Mechanisms

Arguments for the contagious effect of coups have been made since coups were a focus
of political research. South America witnessed a huge spike in coups d’état in the 60's and 70's
leading to a reaction among civil-military scholars. The geographical clustering of coups during
this period was apparent, and as a result argument regarding the contagious nature of coups
emerged. In what was a robust survey of determinants at the time, Putnam argues that in Latin
America from 1951 to 1965, coup contagion was clearly not the cause of these events (Putnam,
1967, pp. 102-103). First, Putnam used a tally of successful coups for ‘conceptual’ reasons.
While a failed coup may result in harsh repression and therefore negative signals to others, a
success would put the putsch initiators into power. Putnam compared the distribution of coups in
six-month intervals, to that of a Poisson distribution. The results indicated that coups were
evenly distributed, not clustered. The random distribution therefore illustrates the absence of any
coup-contagion in Putnam’s opinion. While this effort undermined the coup-contagion
hypothesis at the time, it did little to deter future investigation. One of the primary issues at the
time were the misspecification of spatial autocorrelation and regional constraints.
Midlarsky would later expand the data to sub-Saharan Africa, and make some theoretical
contributions to the pathways through which coups can diffuse (1970). Similar to Putnam,
Midlarsky models the effect of diffusion through a Poisson distribution at defined temporal
windows. Midlarsky however, moves beyond broad strokes and defines the theoretical pathway
for diffusion to take place at the military elite-level (Midlarsky, 1970, p. 64). This opens the door
for moderating and proximate causes that can lead to the contagious properties of coups.
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Ultimately, Midlarsky finds support for the theory of diffusion of coups. Huff and Lutz build on
moderating and proximate causes of diffusion with a largely descriptive exploration of coups in
Africa (1974). This research again employed a temporal window for coups (5 years) and found
that centrality within the sample played a large role in the onset of coups. The temporal window
was an operationalization flaw in these studies, subjecting the pathways for diffusion to
particular periods.
In a final study before academic focus was redirected for a while, Li and Thompson
tested for coup contagion across a global sample (1975). Findings indicate that evidence for coup
contagion exists during certain periods and in particular regions such as Latin America 19551970. While questions regarding methodological specification have been posed, the authors do
articulate a more theoretically concise pathway for diffusion. Coups they argue are “hardly
innovations” and the “idea of a coup is readily available to all who are interested” (Li &
Thompson, 1975, p. 81). While coups are not innovations for the authors in the sense of a brandnew technology, they are occurrences that reinforce an optional behavior. As previously
mentioned, innovations can be re-adopted (Cheng & Shiu, 2008), and so the properties for their
diffusion may be theorized in a consistent manner.
The coup contagion hypothesis was picked back up in scholarship around the end of the
cold war. For the first time, the diffusion within a state is explicitly referenced; “evidence of
internal contagion in the spread of such attempts” exists and is termed emulation (Lutz, 1989, p.
111). While coup literature had previously looked at the historical legacy of coups within a state
as a predictor, this is the first instance it is theoretically tied to the diffusion mechanism.
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Characteristics of Diffusive Pathways

Diffusion is a broad concept that stretches across many social phenomena. For this
research I utilize the definition on diffusion of technological innovations being, “the spread of
some innovation through direct or indirect channels across members of a social system” (Givan,
Roberts, & Soule, 2010; Rogers Everett, 1995). The innovation is the implementation of a coup
d’état to take control of the state apparatus. Members of the social system are in this case, the
elites which precipitate the coup. The term innovation typically refers to a brand-new concept,
something which a coup d’Etat is not.5 However, to initiate a coup is a behavior that is not a
normal or typical action. Innovations are necessarily novel, however the process of re-innovation
or re-adoption does not require a brand-new concept (York & Turcotte, 2015). One would not
expect coups to be adopted continuously, so when speaking on their diffusion it is inherently
regarding their re-innovation. This process has been shown to grant particular competitive
advantages in firm adoption (Cheng & Shiu, 2008). For this research, the diffusion of coups is
synonymous to the re-adoption of innovation. This definition allows for theoretically motivated
pathways through which spatial diffusion may influence the onset of elite-driven coups.
Diffusion and contagion are often used interchangeably (Solingen, 2012), and they will be
treated as such throughout this paper.
Diffusion of innovation is a broadly investigated topic of research. The underlying theme
of diffusion research is that some idea or behavior is passed from one entity in a system to
another. The flow of innovation-information along a pathway between actors, is often the focus

5

At least stretching back to Napoleon’s coup in France.
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of analysis. What mitigates or exacerbates this flow can inform a range of practical and policyoriented questions. Wejnert outlines three basic influencing variables on the diffusion process;
characteristics of innovations, characteristics of innovators, and environmental context (Wejnert,
1988). To understand how coups may diffuse, I begin with what characteristics they exhibit.

Coup Characteristics

Coups are events that have wide ranging effects. When a successful coup occurs, it shifts
the status quo for a country's executive, often placing a new ruling class in power. This new
ruling class has the potential to create monumental change, sometimes at the expense of the
domestic population. When Idi Amin took power, thousands were slaughtered in the years that
followed the coup (Nayenga, 1979). The consequences of these events can be huge because they
are inherently public innovations.
Public innovations are accompanied by features which make diffusion less likely. A
domestic audience is directly involved once a coup has taken place, and therefore is part of the
decision calculus of those orchestrating it (Roberts, 1975; Johnson & Thyne, Squeaky wheels
and troop loyalty: How domestic protests influence coups d'état, 1951--2005, 2018). A public
that is strongly against a coup may lead to issues for coup plotters even if they are successful. In
contrast, a public predisposed to an executive change can lead to a positive increase in military
elites’ preferences towards initiating it. Elites may even overreact when the public sends a signal,
such as through protests (Casper & Tyson, 2014). The potential for diffusion to take place is
influenced by the public’s disposition.
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Diffusion of an innovation is more likely to take place when there is a societal consensus
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). If an innovation has a public impact it is more costly to implement, and
the barriers of initiating such a behavior are higher. When there is constituent agreement about
the innovation however, the costs are mitigated. In the context of coups, this can mean a regime
change is necessitated by the domestic audience. The Egyptian coups of 2011 and 2013 for
instance, represent a time when the costs of coups were mitigated by societal consensus. Mass
demonstrations related to economic hardship from the public created the optimal circumstances
for diffusion to take place.
This high cost is an information-asymmetry about post-coup reactions. When the
innovation is adopted the adoptees run the risk of subsequent costs. When military elites take
control of the government, they risk the growth of opposition after a coup. This can be referred
to as social uncertainty (Dewar & Dutton, 1986). As a mechanism for coups, opposition to the
existing regime is a signal for reduced likelihood a cost is incurred, if the innovation is adopted
(Johnson & Thyne, Squeaky wheels and troop loyalty: How domestic protests influence coups
d'état, 1951--2005, 2018). It is an assurance that the uncertainty will not come to pass if the coup
takes place.
Coup characteristics are therefore, largely mitigating in diffusion likelihood. The high
costs and public nature indicate that coups are not easy to adopt. These events are accompanied
by post-coup uncertainty from civil society, counter-coups from the military, or
sanctions/interventions from foreign nations. This does not erase a pathway for coups to diffuse
however, it alters the conditions for it to transpire. A coup in a neighborhood may not be adopted
by military elites because the costs remain high, and societal consensus is absent. The contagious
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effects of coups can persist, even if a country is not contemporaneously vulnerable. Another
feature of the coup diffusion process is that of the elites that make the attempt. The
characteristics of these actors also have impacts on how and when diffusion may take place.

Elite Characteristics

Elites are most often the entity that initiates and executes a coup. The size of the group
and source of information are important features to consider when analyzing diffusion. Coup
diffusion is a re-adoption of an innovation and elites are not learning that a putsch is an entirely
new concept. Instead these elites are re-innovating and the diffusion pathway is about familiarity.
These groups are typically small collectives, at times including larger cadres of soldiers
following orders. Being that these groups are small collectives has an impact on the costs
associated with innovation adoption. The public nature of coups also leads to a diversification of
plausible sources from which diffusion can derive.
Group size has an influence on the relative responsibility each group member has. When
small groups take on an action there results in fewer individuals with which blame can be spread,
given a failure. Under such circumstances it is less likely for innovations to be adopted due to the
inherent costs associated. In contrast things such as social movements have less individual
responsibility associated with participation. Having close ties to the larger group is not
necessary, and diffusion is more likely under such circumstances (Wejnert, 1988). For elites
however, the blame is clearly assigned among the participants. The potential for diffusion to
result in adoption amid such actors becomes reduced further due to these costs. However, the
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ability for information to pass to actors such as these is varied. Where the actors receive the
diffusion of an innovation can include non-personal sources.
The actor’s familiarity with an innovation is important for its adoption. Ceteris paribus,
when an innovation is less familiar it will have a lower adoption rate (Greve, Performance,
aspirations and risky organizational change, 1998). Given that this innovation is an act of
treason, the diffusion within a state is inherently costly. Soldiers cannot normalize the act and
maintain their position within the armed forces. The concept of familiarity as a diffusion
mechanism is crucial for a coup contagion pathway. While elites may be aware of the concept of
coups, familiarity signaled by the prevalence of coups in the neighborhood, increases the tactics
potential for re-adoption. Diffusion among groups is typically less constrained when individuals
have interpersonal relationships (Rogers Everett, 1995). So, the soldier can share information
with close squad-mates easier than with entities from another region or even country. This sort of
diffusion helps to explain the diffusion within the state. As soldiers are more familiar with the
coup, it makes them more likely to conduct one themselves (Lutz, 1989). And yet, given the high
costs domestic diffusion does not explain all potential coup diffusion.
As stated, coups are public innovations. Since the coup maintains this characteristic, nonrelational sources of information are significant and plausible pathways for diffusion (Meyer &
Rowan, 1977). These non-relational sources can be things like the news media. Information
exchange through this medium is not constrained by national borders. As such a coup in a region
may influence a state that has never had a coup before. Under these circumstances the innovation
could not be diffused from within. Take the Ivory Coast coup of 1999. This was the first coup in
the history of Ivory Coast. Yet within the past decade, close proximate neighbors had no less
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than 5 coups take place. And, only a few months prior Guinea-Bissau and Niger had successful
coups. In the case of Ivory Coast, the ruling executive’s popular support was waning and societal
consensus for the coup was present. With rapid economic decline and an uninterested France, the
conditions for coup diffusion were heightened. The coup leader, General Guei, was well
familiarized with the recent events within the region. “General Robert Guei's first remarks as the
first military ruler of Ivory Coast could have come from the textbooks of one of the west African
country's more volatile neighbors” (Wallis, 1999). The coup innovation was implemented for the
first time in the Ivory Coast. The combination of a historical legacy and recent coups in the
region, led to an optimal situation for elites to be acutely familiar with the tactic. Coup diffusion
in this case is not about the introduction to the concept, but the habituation of it as a viable tactic.
Coup and elite characteristics lead to important considerations regarding the potential for
diffusion. The public nature of coups means they have high costs, and the domestic audience
plays a role in diffusion. The actors involved in coups are often small collectives. These groups
have larger costs given the responsibility is less easily distributed. The potential for nonrelational diffusion sources does allow for military elite’s access to coup familiarity through
neighboring behavior. Coup diffusion hinges on not the introduction of a new concept, but the
habituation and resulting familiarity of a tactic. The mitigating characteristics of coups and the
elites who orchestrate them are joined by one additional domain through which diffusion is
influenced, environmental conditions.
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Environmental Characteristics

The public nature of coups and the small collectives that precipitate them make the
diffusion pathway highly constrained. A final consideration regarding diffusion is the
environment in which it takes place. Coups are not a new concept, but instead a re-adoption of an
innovation under circumstances that warrant it. An environment primed for coups, is one in
which diffusion is most likely to occur. Take as a metaphor the COVID-19 pandemic. Two
individuals are exposed to the virus and become infected. One individual is asymptomatic, while
the other becomes ill and is hospitalized. The COVID-19 is equally contagious in both cases, but
the individuals have different outcomes. A plausible explanation is that the asymptomatic
individual is very young, and the individual who becomes sick is very old. Thus, the
environmental characteristics play an important role in the diffusion of sickness related to the
virus.
Conceptually, the environment in which military coups diffuse has a similar effect on
transmission. An environment which is more likely to reduce constraints, is one that is inherently
more prone to the outcomes. For instance, coups almost exclusively take place in poorer nations
(Londregan & Poole, 1990). When wealth is conditioned on democracy an even greater effect
takes place (Schiel, 2019). Much like being old has an important effect on whether COVID-19
will lead to illness, so too do the conditions a state finds itself in relate to whether coups will
diffuse.
While the Ivory Coast coup of 1999 was the first coup in history, some public reaction to
the coup was supportive (Abidjan, 1999). Even the political party of the ousted leader supported
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the coup (Press A. , Ousted Ivoirian's Party Supports Coup Leaders, 1999). This reaction is
unsurprising given the conditions in the country pre-coup. Corruption in the Ivory Coast was
rampant, and this was made all the clearer by an EU funding embezzlement scandal. Cocoa
prices, the country's main export, also had collapsed leaving the nation economically unstable.
When the coup took place, rather than abhorring the regime change, Ivorians were just the
opposite (Wallis, 1999). In this case the environment was ripe for a coup to diffuse to a country
which had never previously witnessed one.
In contrast, some states are well insulated from coups. This insulation does not indicate
that coup diffusion is absent. Instead it just mitigates the potential for a coup to be adopted. It
remains plausible that a neighborhood witnesses a number of coups and some states are immune
because the environmental characteristics are not conducive for a coup. For this reason, coup
diffusion needs to be sensitive to both the immediate shock of a coup, and the historical legacy.
By accounting for both of these features of coups, a pathway for diffusion that accounts for the
potential conditions for re-adoption is more appropriate. Coup, elite, and environmental
characteristics all play a role in diffusion and whether an innovation is adopted. A proxy for coup
contagion needs to account for the theoretical expectations given these characteristics.

Isolating a Coup Diffusion Pathway

The most recent coup conation hypothesis test was compared to other social phenomena
that may also diffuse. Miller and colleagues outline three pathways for diffusion; emulation,
learning, and focal points (Miller, Joseph, & Ohl, 2016). The authors articulate that they find
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coups unlikely to diffuse along any of these pathways. “Elites are aware of the gains from coups,
well-educated in the use of force, and advantaged in the ability to coordinate” (Miller, Joseph, &
Ohl, 2016, p. 25). Miller et. al. posit that the characteristics of coups and the actors involved are
far more susceptible to diffusion in the process of mass-driven events such as protests.
However, the authors articulate a comparison between two diffusion processes that have
uniquely different characteristics. In a coup d’état the actors adopting the innovation are most
often elites with strong ties. In mass-driven events actors are largely mass collectives of civilians.
The likelihood of participation of individuals with weak ties to a collective is actually much
higher than those in a smaller collective with close ties (Wejnert, 1988; Bloom, 2002). When a
protest takes place, the responsibility is distributed across the entirety of a group, making
individual repercussions smaller. Identifying diffusion of mass-driven events, therefore, is much
less constrained by the potential for immunity among the actors. In a failed coup however, the
consequences are severe to the point of death.
The primary issue with the coup contagion findings for Miller and colleagues is not the
theoretical plausibility of the pathways, but the sensitivity in measuring diffusion. Coups are rare
events, with high costs to actors and characteristics that largely mitigate their occurrence.
Operationalizing a neighborhood's level of contagion as the presence of recent coups,
undervalues the historical legacy of coups. Actors are more likely to adopt an innovation when
they are more familiar with it. Setting a largely arbitrary temporal threshold reduces the
sensitivity to overall familiarity.
Measuring coup contagion through only the occurrence of coups is similar to measuring a
virus that can be asymptomatic. If only people who get sick are recorded, then the contagious
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properties are greatly underestimated. The contagious properties of coups are the same way.
Measuring only the recent occurrences of coups misses the full range of possible diffusion
effects taking place.
Coup diffusion should not only be proxied as a shock effect, expected to have an
immediate and noticeable influence on coup onset. Instead coup diffusion is inherently the
salience of the innovation for military elites. Much the same way that a historical context of coup
familiarizes domestic elites and makes a coup more probable, so too does coup history in one's
neighborhood. This leads to alternative specification of coup diffusion.
A state's time since coup is consistently an important predictor for coups (Londregan &
Poole, 1990). States that have coups are more likely to have coups soon after, at least when
compared with states that have not had one recently or never had one at all. This creates a linear
relationship between the explanatory variable of time since, and the probability that a coup takes
place in a given country-year. This value grants a historical context of coups within a state. Why
might a state that has had coups recently be more apt than one that has not? Among other aspects
of state capabilities and civil-military relations, the diffusive characteristics of coups within a
state's military elite is one of the features of this measure. The innovation once perceived as a
viable behavior, can be emulated, learned from, and replicated.
Setting a threshold of the past year, two, five, or even ten, is taking an arbitrary and
unnecessary theoretical leap into when an innovation should have been transmitted between
units. Furthermore, this is inappropriate given the rarity of the outcome being diffused and the
nature of the innovation itself. A count or presence of coups in a window captures a shock. But
coups are an innovation with high costs. With a slew of mitigating characteristics, a shock alone
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is more likely washed out in a large-n statistical analysis. Coups are not immediately contagious;
they are innovations that lie dormant until the environment is more conducive for onset. Rather
than being a shock that by itself can cause an outcome; “contagious recipiency then is
determined almost wholly by the degree of readiness of the recipient to be influenced” (Li &
Thompson, 1975, p. 81). Coups are not random events that occur with little planning or temporal
considerations. The Chilean coup of 1973 which installed the Pinochet regime, saw formal
written plans as early as October of 1970 in the CIA project Fubelt (The National Security
Archive - Project). Successful coups typically include elites who formulate meticulous plans
over time (Hebditch & Connor, 2009). An operationalization that is sensitive to historical and
recent coups within a neighborhood, grants the best approximation for coup contagion. This
measure is a proxy for the familiarity a state’s military elite has with the coup innovation.
Utilizing this new measure of familiarity, I re-test the coup contagion hypothesis. The
original argument made by Huntington regarding contagious coups posited that successful coups
would send the strongest signal. I therefore start with a base hypothesis as follows.

Hypothesis 1a: High values of Successful Coup Contagion increase the likelihood of a coup
occurring in a state.

Initially scholars assumed that only successful coups sent signals to neighbors. This was
argued to be the case because a successful putsch demonstrated both the strategy needed, and the
benefit gained post-hoc. However, diffusion can occur even in failure. Failed attempts may show
elites what not to do, or even how the international community would react. Furthermore,
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innovation diffusion processes are not constrained to only those which succeed (Greve & Seidel,
2015). The failure of an innovation adoption can actually increase its diffusion to other actors
because they see what not to do and receive information about a host of other aspects of
implementation. Paraguay was a country where the presence of a coup was nonexistent for more
than a 30 year stretch that ended in 1989 when Andrés Rodríguez took control of the
government. While Rodríguez was undoubtedly familiar with the coup tactic, his acumen in
orchestrating one may have been furthered by regional events. South America as a region is no
stranger to coups, however the 1980’s was a comparatively quiet time. The two most recent
coups in Paraguayan neighbors took place in 1984 (Bolivia) and 1988 (Argentina), both failures.
In Bolivia coup plotters managed to kidnap the president, however a failure to consolidate the
military led to the coup being quickly abandoned (Bolivian president is kidnapped, then freed, in
an aborted coup, 1984). In Argentina Colonel Seineldin (an individual with links to both
Panama’s Manuel Noriega who is also familiar with the coup tactic) orchestrated a similar event
where he managed to take some military buildings, but failed to fully consolidate power (Nash,
1991). In Paraguay however, a coup took place in 1989 that succeeded. Rodríguez managed to
consolidate military power and overthrow the regime in less than 24 hours. The coup was in part
because Rodríguez had economic interests in control and didn’t want that impinged if passed
over (Galván, 2012, p. 94). Interestingly Rodríguez had particular economic ties with both
Bolivia (Sims, 1997) and Argentina (Oppenheimer, 1989). These close ties surely allowed for
Rodríguez to pay close attention in the particularities related to the coup tactic in close
neighbors, even if they were failures.
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Hence, I will also test the diffusive influence of all attempted coups, to determine the
contagious properties of coup events as a whole. The expectation here is that elites will perceive
a coup attempt and become familiarized with the innovation, even if it was not successful. Even
in failure the innovation is at work, and familiarity is conveyed. Elites may judge what went
wrong, and better position themselves to improve upon it.

Hypothesis 1b: High values of Attempted Coup Contagion increase the likelihood of a coup
occurring in a state.

The novel theoretical operationalization of diffusion will provide a new test for the coup
contagion hypothesis. This test will include a more sensitive measure applied with a full range of
spatial neighborhoods. However, before conducting a formal hypothesis test, a preliminary step
is required to better illustrate the spatial properties of coups. The coup contagion hypothesis has
been tested numerous times, sometimes using regression analysis and significance interpretation.
Yet, scholars have avoided an important initial step in the assessment of spatial properties for
any phenomena. Typically, the first step in assessing whether a feature has particular spatial
properties is to conduct geospatial exploratory analysis. In the following section I will conduct a
test of spatial autocorrelation to answer the first question necessary for a diffusion argument, is
the innovation clustered in space?
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Empirics

The focal point of this research both in terms of outcome and variables for prediction is
the coup d'état. I utilize the Powell and Thyne data set on coups (Powell & Thyne, Global
instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset, 2011). I also utilize the REIGN data set
which extends coup work and also aggregates additional leader-level data (Bell, 2016).
Definitionally a coup attempt is an “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites
within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive'' (Powell & Thyne, Global instances of
coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset, 2011, p. 252). Furthermore, a successful attempt is one
in which the coup-plotters maintain control over the state apparatus for at least seven days. The
unit of analysis is the country year and stretches from 1950 to 2019. Using the specific moment
when a coup takes place, I also calculate values representing the time since the event has
occurred and use these values to construct neighborhood contagion predictors. First a robust and
exhaustive test of spatial autocorrelation is conducted to assess the potential for coups to cluster
in space.

Spatial Autocorrelation

The first question when addressing a theory on the contagious properties of coups need
be: are coups spatially autocorrelated? The use of exploratory spatial analysis can be seen as a
first step to uncover the diffusive properties of an innovation (O'loughlin, et al., 1998). A formal
hypothesis test of contagion is unfounded without evidence that a particular innovation is
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clustered in space.6 To build a strong case for coup diffusion, I explore its spatial properties as a
first step. Spatial autocorrelation can be thought of as the visual clustering of a feature. The
standard method for assessing this correlation is the Moran's I coefficient (Moran, 1950). Using
the row standardization method this can be written as:

Figure 6 – Moran’s I Formula

The process for deriving Moran's I statistic7 for coup d’état includes two primary
decisions. First is that of aggregating the data to a preferred format in terms of temporal
resolution. Recent studies of coups are often analyzed at the yearly level. Monthly aggregations
would increase specificity, and broader choices such as decade or cumulative sum over the entire
span would lower specificity. Work on the determinants of coups have also shown that the cold
war led to an increased number of coups due to great power competition over smaller states. This
leaves a broad range of possibly useful data aggregations for coups, all with certain benefits and
drawbacks in assessing spatial autocorrelation. Are coups spatially autocorrelated during the cold
war but not afterwards? What about certain decades? Rather than choose one, or a few, of these

6

Non-spatial methods for neighborhood identification are also plausible for coup diffusion. This could be similarity
or economic neighborhoods for instance. This research is focused solely on the spatial properties, however.
7
The coefficient's value [-1,1] represents a measure of negative or positive spatial autocorrelation, respectively.
Values close to zero indicate no clustering within the sample (assuming the homogenous distribution across the
attribute of concern). Additionally, w represents the weight matrix which indicates the polygonal dependence
between units i and j. The value being assessed for spatial dependence (in this case a coup), is indicated by q.
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aggregations, I survey a range and provide an overall synthesis of Moran's I statistics to better
represent the spatial association of coup d'état.
The second step in calculating the Moran's I statistic is to define a spatial weight matrix
w.8 The (n x n) matrix represents the value of spatial dependence which each unit i, has relative
to unit j. The connectivity matrix between units can be defined by the unit’s contiguity, nearness,
or congruence to each other. Contiguity refers to queen and rook methods. A contiguous queen
dyad shares any vertices; however, a rook-based dyad must meet a minimum threshold to be
given a positive value in the spatial weight matrix. Similar to chess, a rook method is constrained
to only those neighbors which share a significant border. Contiguity methods are useful to think
about the transmission of innovation across sovereign borders. When a state shares a border, the
flow of people is typically more feasible than two states separated by a number of additional
borders. Permeability of noncontiguous states is lower than in contiguous neighbors. The
distinction of sharing a significant border, or one at all, is not the only means through which
diffusion can take place, however. Nearness rather than contiguity can be a more theoretically
plausible measure for contagion.
China shares a border with India in the Tibetan region. This is a comparatively less
populated area than nearly any other place in China. China does not share a contiguous border
with many of the countries geographically nearest to its most populated regions such as Japan,
South Korea, Cambodia, Thailand, and other island nations in the South China Sea.
Theoretically, transmission of innovations would be equal, or even more plausible for these noncontiguous neighbors given the greater share of Chinese citizens closer to said countries. Under

8

The spatial weight matrix will be important during the hypothesis test as well.
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this circumstance, arguments against a purely contiguity-based weighting specification are clear.
To account for this possibility, neighborhoods can be based on nearness. Nearness methods
include K-nearest neighbors (setting a minimum number of neighbors that must receive a
weight), and kernel bandwidth method which represents another form of neighborhood based on
functional distances. In these methods a weight matrix is determined by distance or neighbor,
rather than sharing a border.
Given a weighting method, the manner in which spatially dependent values are
operationalized is the final step in constructing a diffusion feature. The equation above depicts
the row standardization method which takes all weighted units in a matrix row and sets them
equal to one. For instance, if a unit has four contiguous neighbors and we select row
standardization, each neighbor will get an equal one-quarter weight applied to the innovation
being diffused. A binary method would give each of the contiguous neighbors a weight value of
1 and all other non-contiguous values a 0. Finally, variance stabilizing is a method particularly
useful for dealing with heteroskedastic data (Tiefelsdorf & Boots, 1997; Anselin & Rey, 2014).
Each of these methods of standardization results in slightly different measures of diffusion.
Rather than choosing a single weight matrix or parameter, I calculate statistics for each
combination to better assess whether coups are spatially autocorrelated. This alleviates the
possibility a relationship is dependent upon the particular matrix specification or parameter
choice. The drawback of this approach is that it is computationally intensive. For each weight
matrix (rook, queen, kernel, and k-nearest neighbors) the parameters within each will be varied
as well as the standardization method (row, binary, variance). In total, this results in over one
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hundred weight-matrix combinations that are then applied to each data aggregation for
subsequent spatial autocorrelation statistic derivation.

Global Statistic Results

The calculation of Global Moran's I on the outcome coups d’état across all aggregations
and parameter specifications, shows a strong positive spatial autocorrelation. Positive spatial
autocorrelation is conferred by a coefficient in the positive range (closer to 1). These statistics
are accompanied by P-values used for determination of significance. I first point to the
aggregations related to the largest cleavages of the data sample utilized. Global refers to the data
from 1950 to 2019 including all countries. This aggregation has the total number of coups
witnessed summed into one cumulative value per country. Cold War and Post-Cold War are
similarly constructed within the respective period.
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Figure 7 – Global Moran's I Values

Figure 7 – Global Moran's I Values does not include P-values because no matter the
parameterization (neighborhood or standardization method), every Moran's I value achieves
statistical significance at (P < .05). Instead I represent all coefficients with a violin plot to give a
better idea of just how strong a positive correlation exists in the data. Coefficients are almost
entirely above 0.5 and the mean values are all close to 0.8 (indicated by the white dot in the
center). Confidence intervals indicated by the horizontal black lines, show the range of
coefficients. The colored bubbles around the confidence interval lines indicate the distribution of
coefficients found at that level. For instance, Post-Cold War has the largest distribution between
the .7 and .8 coefficients whereas the Cold War period is more normally distributed. The figure
indicates a strong positive correlation in the data. Interpretation of this can be as follows; the
presence of coups is positively spatially autocorrelated. The Cold War period has the largest
coefficient (more coups occurred during this period), when compared to the Post-Cold War
period aggregations which is consistent with existing literature on coups.
This initial look at the spatial autocorrelation of coups confers a few things. First, no
matter the weight matrix choice or standardization method, coups display spatial clustering
across the world. These innovations occur less in referent countries when they are surrounded by
others who do not witness coups. Inversely the state's that do witness coup attempts, are
surrounded by other nations who are similar in this regard. However, coups may cluster because
their determinants, such as poverty, are spatially autocorrelated. While these general
aggregations do not confirm the diffusive properties of coups, without the presence of clustering
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diffusion would be less plausible. Spatial autocorrelation is not a formal test; however, it does
uncover the underlying spatial context. While global, pre/post-cold war aggregations are broad
aggregations, they still relay important information about the clustering of coups.
When aggregating and calculating the Moran's I at the yearly level roughly 95% of the
tests achieve statistical significance across all neighborhood operationalizations and parameters.
Coefficient values do drop on average compared to the global aggregations, however. The
average coefficient across significant models is roughly .54. This still represents a positive
spatial autocorrelation, albeit to a lesser degree than more broad aggregations. Some years do not
witness any coups, and coups clustering at a more fine-grained temporal resolution may
obfuscate the pathways in which coups are clustering. The expectation that coup contagion
should result in an immediate spread is illogical. Coup, elite, and environmental characteristics
instead suggest diffusion can be asymptomatic in many countries, and only under particular
circumstances result in an event occurrence.
Diving into the yearly aggregations a little more gives some context to what this spatial
autocorrelation represents pragmatically. In 1955 three coups precipitated in Argentina, while
Brazil and Paraguay witnessed one a piece. In 1967 Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Sierra Leone
(two)9 all also had coups occur. These two years had statistically significant average Moran's I
coefficients of .81 and .74 respectively, indicating a positive autocorrelation. In contrast the year
of 2013 did not achieve statistical significance and it only witnessed a single coup in Egypt.

9

The geographer will quickly note that Sierra Leone shares no border(contiguity) with any of the aforementioned
nations. Many of the neighborhood constructions including K-nearest neighbors and Kernel Bandwidth would
however allow for the dyadic relationship between Sierra Leone and these other nations. In terms of actual distance
and the shared Gulf of Guinea, this relationship makes theoretical sense as well.
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Without more temporally broad aggregations it is hard to get stable statistics given the rarity of
coups.
Yearly levels alone do not fully capture the spatial clustering of coups, just as the broad
aggregations failed in this respect. The combination of a range of aggregations is more
informative on the question of coup clustering. A coup in December of one year may inspire a
neighboring military elite in the subsequent year to perform such an action. The clustering of
coups at particular years however grants a comprehensive look at when the spatial
autocorrelation spikes. Beyond a broad measure of positive or negative spatial autocorrelation
across the entire data, it is possible to garner unit-level statistics. This will help to uncover not
just are coups clusters, which Moran's I statistic indicates they do, but where exactly is this
autocorrelation taking place. These individual level statistics for spatial autocorrelation, take the
analysis closer to the use of diffusion in a regression setting.

Local Spatial Statistic

Global statistics are useful to grant an overall statistic on whether or not a feature, coups,
demonstrates spatial autocorrelation. But as the previous yearly examples illustrate, the variation
of autocorrelation is not homoscedastic in distribution. Some years witness more coups than
others, and this can skew the overall picture of spatial autocorrelation. To tease out a more finegrained pattern of spatial autocorrelation, a local statistic is useful. This is a method of
identifying “pockets of nonstationarity” within the data (Anselin, 1995). Referent spatial units
can have five potential values with reference to a local statistic. The values can be not-
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significant, positive, and negatively related, as well as high-low and low-high values. Hot spots
and cold spots are representative of spatial units whose values are either positively or negatively
related to those values within its neighborhood, respectively. A country deemed a hot spot,
would be one where coups are occurring in high volumes within its neighborhood. Inversely a
cold spot would be a country which itself has a low number of coups and so too does its
neighbors.
High-lows are those spatial units which have high values while other units in the
neighborhood have low ones, also referred to as a diamond. This would be a country which has a
large number of coups but is surrounded by nations where coups do not occur often. Low-high in
contrast are those units which have low values when they are surrounded by spatial units with
high ones, or doughnuts. I now present two demonstrations of this technique across South
America and Sub-Saharan Africa. These values are calculated using queen's contiguity
neighborhood across the entire temporal span of the sample. These demonstrations are not
constrained to the regions themselves but are derived globally.
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Figure 8 – LISA South America

South America has a few unique results. Most countries are represented as hotspots,
meaning that there is a positive spatial autocorrelation for coups. Chile and Uruguay are
doughnuts. Even though both of these countries have had two coups, the nations around them
have had far more making them low-high local spatial autocorrelations. Chile, per a queen's
contiguity, shares borders with three other countries: Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru. In terms of
cumulative coup attempts, Bolivia, and Argentina rank number one and two respectively for the
most coups. Peru is not low either at eight coups. While Chile has two coups which is more than
many nations around the world, compared to its neighbors it is actually not a positive spatial
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autocorrelation. Many of the islands are cold spots which is not surprising considering queen’s
contiguity requires a shared border, meaning that these entities would have no neighbors. Under
a distance-based weighting method, these islands would have neighbors however opening up the
potential for alternative spatial autocorrelation statistics.

Figure 9 – LISA Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa shows more variation at localized levels. Senegal is a nation which
has witnessed a single coup attempt in 1962. It does share a border with Mali, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Mauritania, and The Gambia. While Mauritania does not achieve significance, it has
witnessed seven coups. Mali has had six, Guinea five, and Guinea-Bissau eight. This is a pretty
clear doughnut given the large number of coups in its neighborhood yet small number in
Senegal. Cameroon and South Sudan are both also low-high values of spatial autocorrelation,
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indicating that their neighbors have a greater presence of the outcome. By attaining local spatial
statistics, it is possible to uncover sub-global patterns of spatial autocorrelation and better
understand how coups diffuse differently across the world. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa
hotspots are abundant, indicating a positive spatial autocorrelation. A few doughnuts also show
that some areas are not indicative of clustering.
Clearly coups exhibit a tendency for clustering. This is true regardless of the aggregation,
weighting technique, or standardization method. Looking into localized statistics such as LISA
shows exactly where coup hotspots are. Results of both the global and local spatial indicator for
association lends further credence to a formal test of spatial diffusion across a global sample. The
coup-contagion hypothesis has been investigated multiple times, but this is the first use of spatial
autocorrelation as preliminary support. Given the statistically significant findings to the question
of whether coups cluster in space, I will estimate a model for spatial diffusion of coups. The
presence of coup clustering, while not alone indicative of diffusion, does suggest that a test for
contagion is appropriate. While previous tests exist and results have been contradictory, the
reanalysis of the potential pathways for coup diffusion has led to a new operationalization. By
first assessing the spatial autocorrelation, I have more adequately formed a basis for
reinvestigation.

Spatial Dependence

I now turn to the hypothesis-testing empirical section. The primary concern here is to
assess whether coup contagion is a statistically significant covariate for the coup event. The unit
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of analysis will not be varied for this portion of the analysis. The focus is placed on coup
outcomes at the country-year level as a function of their contagious attributes. The sample is
global in spatial resolution and temporally spans the years 1950 until 2019.

Y Lag manipulation

The spatial autocorrelation test was done at the year, or a more aggregated temporal
resolution. In this context, testing for coup outcomes using a cumulative total of coups was
appropriate. Studies on coup-contagion have opted for a time threshold to measure the presence
or number of coups within a region (Midlarsky, 1970; Lutz, 1989; Lunde, 1991; Miller, Joseph,
& Ohl, 2016). For instance, within the last five years, how many coups have occurred in a state's
neighborhood. While this does a good job of capturing the shock of recent coups, it is losing an
important aspect of historical propensity for coups within the region. Given that coup, elite, and
environmental characteristics are mitigating the instant transmission of coups across borders, a
shock indicator is theoretically ill-suited.
One of the most robust and relied upon determinants of coups is the time since a country
has experienced it's last coup (Londregan & Poole, 1990). This measure captures when a coup
was last witnessed, and potentially how strong the signal is for diffusion to transfer to elites
within the state. The familiarization of coups domestically is a consistent mechanism to how they
transmit externally. Non-relational sources are plausible origins for innovation diffusion when
the innovation is public (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Elites do not need to interact with their coup-
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initiating counterparts in other nations for familiarization. I extend this logic to a measure for the
diffusive properties of coups outside beyond national borders.
Rather than an arbitrary threshold for when coup attempts/success should be included, the
operationalization captures the historical prevalence of coups in a neighborhood. This is a more
appropriate measure because it identifies whether a state has more or less opportunity for coups
to diffuse from the neighborhood. Coups being a rare event (less than 4% of country-years
witness a coup), makes the diffusion signal less likely to be influential when measured as a
shock. Capturing whether an unlikely event takes place in an already constrained temporal
threshold, while subjecting it to a weighting method which further devalues the rare event, is an
inappropriate operationalization for the contagious coup.
Coup outcomes are first transformed to a count of years since last occurrence. These
values are then passed to the weight matrix. Since this is a linear count value, starting from the
beginning of the data, it will naturally have a positive trend over time. As such by itself the
measure is capturing a linear temporal trend with only small variations since weighting matrices
dilute signals of neighbors due to the inclusion of multiple units. What is important is not the
expected positive linear trends of states, but the deviation of that trend line from the expected
coup-less neighborhood. This deviation measures a neighborhood’s overall level of contagion,
both immediate shocks and historical legacy. For this purpose, I generate a baseline measure for
each neighborhood to establish what value would indicate the absolute absence of coups. The
difference between baseline and observed diffusion measure is then computed.
This measure of spatial lag is endogenous to spatial autocorrelation. In other words, just
as coups in one country may affect neighbors, so too may neighbors affect coups in that country.
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To mitigate this in modeling however, the temporal aspect of the coup event is considered. The
time since variable only measures up till the previous year. This lag is both spatial and temporal
then. Coup contagion in a particular year does not account for the presence of a coup in the
neighboring countries in a contemporaneous year, just those leading up to it. This is the most
appropriate method to deal with the potential endogeneity issue.
I test for the contagious properties of both coup success (Hypothesis 1a) and coup
attempts (Hypothesis 1b). While Huntington originally theorized that coup success would be a
significant influencer on the events in neighboring entities, attempts may also generate signals.
Neighborhoods are weighted using all four methods (rook, queen, k-nearest neighbor, and kernel
bandwidth), varying parameter specifications when possible. The standardization techniques are
also varied using binary, row, and variance stabilizing across each weight matrix. A correlation
matrix of each combination is displayed in Figure 24. Results are fairly consistent across
weighting and standardization methods, presented below in the first set of models are
neighborhoods of queen’s contiguity with row standardization. The formalization of the model is
shown as:
𝐹(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 ) =

𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

Where coup (attempts) at time (t) in country (i) is a function of a neighborhood contagion
predictor (either attempt or success), plus the vector z of all control variables included in each
model and the error term ϵ. Controls presented include time since (including squared and cubic
splines (Carter & Signorino, 2010)), the natural log of real GDP per capita (Feenstra, Inklaar, &
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Timmer, 2015), the natural log of military expenditure per soldier (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey,
1972), democracy (Bell, 2016), and a cold war indicator for years between 1960 and 1991.
The coup outcome is dichotomous, and I therefore estimate it using a logistic regression.
The dispersion of coups in all country-years is a rare event. In order to control for omitted
variable bias I also include models with country and year fixed effects.

Diffusion of Successful Coups

Table 3 – Primary Contagion Results
Coup Attempt
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Attempt Contagion (Q,R) 0.119**
0.135*
0.407***
(0.048)
(0.074)
(0.072)
***
**
Coup Contagion (Q,R)
0.165
0.142
0.364***
(0.046)
(0.07)
(0.064)
***
***
***
Time Since
-0.162 -0.162 -0.188 -0.187***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026)
GDP pc(ln)
-0.433*** -0.434***
(0.081) (0.081)
Military Exp (ln)
-0.047 -0.046
(0.046) (0.046)
Democracy
-0.103 -0.113 -0.459*** -0.486***
(0.161) (0.162) (0.124) (0.124)
Cold War
0.571*** 0.553***
(0.146) (0.144)
***
***
Constant
-3.303
-3.31
1.538** 1.55** -3.156*** -3.211***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.622) (0.622) (0.72) (0.719)
Observations
11088.0 11088.0 6567.0 6567.0 11088.0 11088.0
2
Pseudo R
0.002
0.004
0.147
0.147
0.159
0.158
Log Likelihood
-1705.41 -1702.27 -1011.34 -1010.94 -1437.2 -1437.72
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AIC
BIC

3414.83 3408.53 2040.69 2039.89 3026.4 3027.44
3429.45 3423.16 2101.79 2101.0 3582.24 3583.28
*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Fixed Effects in models 5 & 6
Splines not shown

Note:

The results show clearly that neighborhood coup diffusion is a positive and significant
predictor of military coups. In
Table 3 – Primary Contagion Results, the two measures for coup diffusion are Attempt
Contagion (Q,R) and Coup Contagion (Q,R). Attempt contagion refers to the spatial diffusion of
coup events that include failed attempts. Coup contagion refers to only the diffusion of
successful coups. The letters Q,R indicate the spatial neighborhood method and standardization.
Q stands for queen's contiguity, and R stands for row standardization. See Table 14 –
Neighborhood Measures, for a full list of grammar used for identification.
The larger the value for a contagion indicator, the greater a difference between the
baseline weighted count value and the spatially lagged neighborhood coup value. The positive
sign indicates that more coup contagion in a neighborhood increases the probability that a
country will witness a coup. The diffusion value remains significant and positive even with the
inclusion of a state's time since coup variable and its splines. GDP per capita is negative and
significant consistent with existing literature. The cold war indicator is also positive indicating
that coups are more frequent during that period. Democracy is only significant when fixed
effects are added to the model. Overall, this model shows evidence that the diffusion of both
coups and coup attempts have an influence on the coup events. This initial model is showing just
one spatial weight matrix operationalization. Given the lower log-likelihood, and Akaike and
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Bayesian information criterions, I present results with controls consistent to models three and
four above while varying coup contagion measures.
In general, all weight specifications achieve statistical significance.10 The effect of kernel
nearness methods are particularly powerful as explanatory variables. This method casts a net
which originates from the center of the country polygon. The size of the net is based on the
bandwidth measure (10 or 20 in the results presented). Under this neighborhood method, a
shared border is not necessary. It is also not constrained to a particular number of neighbors.
This means that countries that are in close proximity to its neighbors may have a higher number
of weighted members. Under this specification Uruguay would only have a few neighbors
(Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile) in its neighborhood. In contrast, Guinea could have upwards
of 12 neighbors.

Table 4 – Kernel Contagion Results Success
Coup Attempt
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Coup Contagion (Kern,R,10) 0.395***
(0.063)
Coup Contagion (Kern,B,10)
0.269***
(0.065)
Coup Contagion (Kern,V,10)
0.397***
(0.064)
Coup Contagion (Kern,R,20)
0.308***
(0.067)
Coup Contagion (Kern,B,20)
0.154**
(0.071)
Coup Contagion (Kern,V,20)
0.305***
(0.068)
10

See the APPENDIX B: DIFFUSION AND COUPS for a range of results corresponding to each weight
specification.
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Time Since
GDP pc(ln)
Military Exp (ln)
Democracy
Cold War
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

-0.15***
(0.035)
-0.373***
(0.081)
-0.104**
(0.045)
-0.163
(0.162)
0.711***
(0.15)
1.236**
(0.628)

-0.159***
(0.034)
-0.386***
(0.082)
-0.071
(0.045)
-0.101
(0.161)
0.652***
(0.149)
1.256**
(0.633)

-0.151***
(0.035)
-0.35***
(0.082)
-0.1**
(0.045)
-0.143
(0.162)
0.694***
(0.149)
1.037
(0.635)

-0.158***
(0.034)
-0.394***
(0.081)
-0.085*
(0.045)
-0.123
(0.161)
0.662***
(0.148)
1.403**
(0.623)

-0.161***
(0.034)
-0.406***
(0.083)
-0.057
(0.046)
-0.084
(0.161)
0.608***
(0.15)
1.389**
(0.626)

-0.158***
(0.034)
-0.355***
(0.082)
-0.09**
(0.045)
-0.109
(0.161)
0.658***
(0.148)
1.133*
(0.632)

6567.0
0.162
-993.64
2005.28
2066.39

6567.0
0.152
-1004.99
2027.98
2089.09

6567.0
0.162
-993.77
2005.54
2066.65

6567.0
0.154
-1002.88
2023.76
2084.87

6567.0
0.147
-1010.69
2039.38
2100.49

6567.0
0.154
-1003.01
2024.02
2085.13

*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:

The kernel method of successful coup diffusion is a potent predictor as can be seen in
Table 4 – Kernel Contagion Results Success. The row and variance standardized kernel method
with a bandwidth of 10 have the largest coefficient of all predictors across models. A state in a
neighborhood with a greater number of successful coups has a much higher probability of
witnessing the event. This goes to support Huntington’s original argument that successful coups
have a spillover effect. The strength of the coup diffusion measure across neighborhoods also
substantiates the need to account for coup, elite, and environmental characteristics. This
operationalization is sensitive to elite familiarity rather than immediate coup shocks.
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Diffusion of Coup Attempts

Although failed coup attempts are not part of Huntington’s original argument, and also
are often overlooked in coup-contagion literature, they warrant further investigation. The novel
operationalization is applied consistently to coup attempts and results are largely consistent.
Neighborhoods characterized by more coup attempts lead to a higher probability a state will
witness a military coup. Table 5 – Kernel Contagion Results shows the relationship of coup
attempt diffusion using the kernel method on coup attempts.

Table 5 – Kernel Contagion Results Attempt
Coup Attempt
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Attempt Contagion (Kern,R,10) 0.527***
(0.073)
Attempt Contagion (Kern,B,10)
0.27***
(0.068)
Attempt Contagion (Kern,V,10)
0.472***
(0.07)
Attempt Contagion (Kern,R,20)
0.358***
(0.072)
Attempt Contagion (Kern,B,20)
0.148**
(0.074)
Attempt Contagion (Kern,V,20)
0.317***
(0.071)
Time Since
-0.151*** -0.16*** -0.154*** -0.159*** -0.161*** -0.159***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
GDP pc(ln)
-0.354*** -0.383*** -0.338*** -0.38*** -0.407*** -0.35***
(0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.083) (0.082)
Military Exp (ln)
-0.129*** -0.07 -0.113** -0.094** -0.055 -0.091**
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
Democracy
-0.202 -0.091 -0.135 -0.123 -0.083 -0.102
(0.162) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.16)
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Cold War
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

0.864***
(0.158)
1.13*
(0.629)

0.685*** 0.79*** 0.75*** 0.616***
(0.152) (0.154) (0.154) (0.152)
1.211* 0.955 1.313** 1.38**
(0.633) (0.637) (0.622) (0.628)

0.705***
(0.152)
1.079*
(0.633)

6567.0
0.168
-985.89
1989.78
2050.88

6567.0
0.152
-1005.36
2028.72
2089.83

6567.0
0.154
-1002.94
2023.88
2084.99

6567.0
0.165
-989.62
1997.24
2058.35

6567.0 6567.0
0.156
0.147
-1000.79 -1010.98
2019.59 2039.96
2080.7 2101.06
*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:

Kernel methods again demonstrate the strongest overall effect in estimating coups. The
row standardized technique and bandwidth of 10 exhibit the largest coefficient of all
specifications. This coefficient is higher than both the economic indicator and the time since the
last coup in a country. In comparison the diffusion of coup attempts has a stronger effect than the
diffusion of successful coups. Table 5 – Kernel Contagion Results Attempt contain models that
perform the best when comparing the goodness of fit measures. This finding is counter to the
original arguments of Huntington and assumptions made by many scholars since. This finding
provides further evidence of the necessity to reframe both the theoretical and technical sensitivity
to a coup diffusion. Accounting for the diffusion of failure and success is important for
explaining global instances of coup d’état.

Discussion

The concept of coup contagion has been investigated a number of times. Many findings
have thus far been contradictory. Attempts to understand this phenomenon have changed the
estimation technique (Poisson, OLS, EBMA), and the general population being investigated.
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Glaringly, the derivation of a coup-diffusion measure has remained almost entirely constant.
Furthermore, while spatially focused methods have become more prevalent in the political
geography subfield, coups have remained insulated. This research makes inroads on both fronts.
A focus on the characteristics of coups, elites, and the environment made it possible to identify
why coup diffusion is more often asymptomatic. Spatial autocorrelation tests provide initial
justification to reinvestigate coup-contagion. A measure that is sensitive to elite familiarity is a
better suited operationalization than one that is purely shock-based. Finally, a full range of
spatially defined neighborhoods substantiates the robustness of results.

Do coups cluster?

This paper is an attempt to approach the question exhaustively. The first step was to
assess global and local statistics for spatial autocorrelation. These statistics were calculated using
a full range of weighting methods and standardization techniques.
Huntington stated that coups in one place could inspire the event in others (Huntington,
1962, p. 345). Since coups are fundamentally tied to the unit of the state and occur at a specific
point in time, it is possible to explore this relationship through spatial analysis. The inspiration or
diffusion of the coup innovation, can first be evaluated in broad strokes, asking questions about
the fundamental distribution of coup events over space. The most appropriate method to
statistically identify if a pattern exists, is a test of spatial autocorrelation. In the section Spatial
Autocorrelation, I outline and implement this method. Results convey a clear pattern; coups are
positively spatially autocorrelated. In other words, coups tend to cluster in certain spatially
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defined neighborhoods. The inverse is also the case, neighborhoods exist where coup events are
largely non-existent.
A test of spatial autocorrelation also provides context for the presence of clustering. For
instance, particular years showed high levels of spatial autocorrelation such as 1955 and 1967.
The Cold War period showed a higher correlation statistic when compared to the post-cold war
period. This could be further indication that while coups were clustered during the cold war
period as great powers fought over particular geographically strategic regions, from the 1990's
onward coups have less of a tendency to occur in the same neighborhoods, relatively. Beyond
just global statistics, local statistics also become informative about the pockets of coupclustering. While nearly all of South America is a hotspot, Chile is a bit of an outlier for coupcontagion.
In summation, this empirical section shows that coups cluster. This finding is not specific
to a particular time window or region. The statistic is calculated across a range of aggregations to
better test whether coups are an innovation that diffuse only under circumstances. The
specification of the neighborhood is also irrelevant to this finding. Coups are positively spatially
autocorrelated. This is not all that surprising given the high number of coups in places such as
South America, or around the Gulf of Guinea. But, achieving statistical significance across such
a wide range of model specifications adds legitimacy to the argument for coup contagion.
Positive spatial autocorrelation does not indicate causality, but it does provide theoretical
leverage for inclusion in an econometric model for parameter estimation. This robust test of
spatial autocorrelation adds to the literature on coups and particularly their diffusive
characteristics. It also furthers the study of geospatial analysis of coups.
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Do coups Diffuse?

Utilizing regional coup contagion as a determinant in coup models is a less unique
practice. The most recent and sophisticated attempt to test for the diffusion of coups actually
found that the average influence of coup contagion is negative (Miller, Joseph, & Ohl, 2016, p.
19). This logic suggests that when a coup occurs in a state's neighborhood, the state is actually
less likely to witness a coup. The authors go on to suggest that coup contagion is not as useful a
measure when compared with more mass driven political events. This is because “there is little
to learn from coups abroad” (Miller, Joseph, & Ohl, 2016, p. 25). And yet, two things
immediately stand out as problematic with this. First, coups do in fact exhibit significant positive
spatial autocorrelation as shown in this paper. When such an autocorrelation exists it
immediately creates complications with model specification if ignored.
Second, if coups do not exhibit diffusive characteristics, why does one of the most robust
statistical predictors capture this logical process? Anecdotally we can see that learning has in fact
occurred in circumstances such as that of Rawlings. More importantly however is that in nearly
every model of coups, a universal variable for inclusion is a measure of coup history within a
state. Coups are conducted largely by military elites within a state, and so a coup history is not a
state characteristic in so much as it is a measure of innovation familiarity. The time elapsed since
the last instance a coup has occurred has a strong negative relationship with coup probability at a
contemporaneous moment. Elites can remember the innovation occurring, witness its effects, and
learn from its processes. While the importance of diffusion among elites may be amplified within
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their own state due to proximity, the characteristics inherent in coup events that make the
diffusion possible do not stop at the border.
Given that elites can theoretically receive information from cross-border coups, but
existing models show a negative relationship, led to a reassessment of the coup contagion
variable itself. Historically coup contagion is identified as either 1) a dichotomous presence of
any coup in a region within a given temporal window, or 2) a cumulative count of coups in a
region within a given window. These measures are then passed through a weighted matrix and
standardized into a single measure. Let us take a simple example; a state i has four neighbors and
we are going to choose a row standardization method. An arbitrary time window of five years is
set. Within this window, one of the four neighbors have a coup. Now when calculating the
spatial weight of coup contagion with the values, windows and neighborhoods defined at time t,
we are given a 0.25 value. This value then drops down to zero when the coup is not within the
five-year window if no other coups have occurred in the neighborhood.
This is not an uncommon value for coup contagion given the distribution of the data.
When looking at a global sample from 1950 until present and specifying a country-year unit of
analysis which is standard, one is left with under 4% of observational rows that have true
positive values for coup attempts (even less for success). It is quite unsurprising then that models
would turn up with a negative value for coup contagion given this operationalization. Does
imbalanced data mean that contagion does not exist then? If this were the case, then nearly any
rare event would be subject to a negative contagion effect. I argue instead that previous measures
are not sensitive to the historical context of the innovation, merely the shock. Shocks are not
representative of the diffusion likely to occur for coups. Coup contagion pathways need to
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account for the mitigating characteristics of the environment, coup and actors involved. Many
state’s may be immune, but this does not require that coups be non-contagious.
In order to rectify this, I turn to the widely accepted method for analyzing within-state
coup diffusion, time since coup. Rather than specifying a value for contagion which is only
sensitive to the presence of coups in an arbitrary temporal span, the value is a deviation from a
baseline of no regional coups. By measuring coup contagion in this way, it can pick up both the
year to year shocks of new regional coups, and still be sensitive to the historical context of coups
in a neighborhood. This allows for a more realistic pathway for the diffusion of an innovation
with such high costs.
Empirically, I then proceed to include a new operationalization for coup contagion.
Unlike previous work which places the onus on a rare event sending a strong shock signal to test
a hypothesis for coup contagion, I employ a measure that is more sensitive to the potential
pathways of diffusion. In contrast to recent work, results show a robust relationship between the
context of coups in a state's neighborhood and their own propensity for coups. Coups have
diffusive characteristics that travel across borders. This finding is agnostic to neighborhood
weighting specifications and standardization methods.
Models of coup diffusion show an interesting finding. The diffusion of attempts is
generally stronger than the diffusion of success. This finding runs counter to original arguments
on coup contagion. This finding goes to exhibit that the familiarity of the innovation is more
important than the immediate contagious effects of a successful coup. The theory behind
successful coups spreading is that other elites would see the event and immediately try to imitate
the success for their own gain. This notion coincides with the operationalization choices of
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previous work. Shocks cause onset. And yet, neighborhoods with high numbers of coup attempts
are also those with greater familiarity with the innovation. Elites witness the habituation of the
coup event, even when it is a failure. This innovation familiarity is key for explaining coup
outcomes. The operationalization of coup diffusion as sensitive to elite familiarity is further
validated by the robust support for Hypothesis 1b.
Future work on coups would do well to operationalize contagion in a theoretically
motivated way. Arbitrary temporal thresholds do little to capture the process through which
coups can diffuse. A shock in mass-driven events may be enough to spark a neighboring
behavior, but coups are functionally different innovations. The public nature leads to high costs,
and the actors involved must weigh a host of environmental conditions related to societal
consensus and uncertainty. Ceteris paribus military elites in a neighborhood with a greater
prevalence of coups are more likely to initiate an attempt on the executive than their counterparts
in less-prone neighborhoods. The coup crosses the border and becomes a familiarized behavior
in these cases. Coup diffusion is apparent for Rawlings who borrowed from the Ethiopian way,
and Sankara who utilized the Rawlings rhetoric, and Guei's first comments to the Ivorian people.
In each case it is clear that borders are not impermeable barriers where information and
behaviors cannot cross.
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CHAPTER FOUR: BACK COUP D’FUTURE – AN ENSEMBLE MACHINE
LEARNING FRAMEWORK FOR COUP PREDICTION

Introduction

Can the overthrow of a government be predicted? Coup d’état is one of the most
investigated outcomes in civil-military relations (Brooks, 2019). While early scholarship often
focused on a few cases, this particular subfield has become increasingly quantitative in nature.
Research has primarily utilized explanatory approaches, searching for a causal link between
some structural feature and the rare event. Causality is generally viewed as the ultimate goal of
social science research (Imai, Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2011). And still, in regard to
episodes of political instability such as military coups, explanation is only part of the puzzle. To
further civil-military literature a combinatory approach is needed.
Coups are rare events (Powell and Thyne only record 466 coup attempts, and 234
successful coups since 1950). After adding hundreds of predictors, many finding some form of
statistical significance,11 a robust predictive framework for the onset of coups remains absent.
2019 saw a successful putsch in Sudan. While post-hoc analysis can do a lot for understanding
what triggered the military overthrow of al-Bashir, few attempts are actively being made to

11

Depending on the construction of the unit-of-analysis coup studies can range from a few hundred up to hundreds

of thousands of observations. In such Large-N studies the importance of p-values becomes overstated (Ward,
Greenhill, & Bakke, 2010).
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predict the onset of the event. Events of political instability can have drastic and often dire
consequences for domestic populations.12 The far-reaching effects of coups warrant a robust
predictive methodological framework to accompany the more common hypothesis-testing.
This paper aims to fill that gap. I propose a unified framework to better assess coup
prediction. In particular, I synthesize methods used in machine learning applications more
generally and apply them to the prediction and forecasting of coups. This process includes the
use of a rolling origin validation strategy, sequential feature selection, and ensemble stacking of
algorithms. Predictive model metrics attained through this application exceed those currently
available, and forecasts are provided based on this methodology. This paper will proceed as
follows: first I provide a synthesis of existing literature on coups and prediction in social science.
Next, I survey a range of features for prediction and articulate a procedure for data processing.
Following, I outline the application of machine learning algorithms in an ensemble fashion.
Finally, model metrics are assessed, and a range of partial dependence plots are used to
demonstrate the predictive capacity of particular features, in essence diving into the black box of
machine learning.

Literature Review

With increased access to computationally intensive methods and the advent of widely
available large-N data sets, scholars have a more diverse toolbox for analysis than in the 20th

12

Why Sudan's deadly crackdown on protesters could escalate in coming weeks
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century. Initially most quantitative social science research was hypothesis-testing. Researchers
scrambled to find generalizable evidence for theoretical arguments. This led to a huge growth of
explanatory findings across a number of fields including those focused on conflict and
instability. However, some began to recognize the futility of mechanism identification through a
purely p-value practice (Ward, Greenhill, & Bakke, 2010). As the number of observations
increases, the threshold to find significant predictors is dramatically reduced. This realization
accompanied by continued computational growth has led to another pivot within quantitative
research design.
Perhaps as a reaction to other disciplines, or simply a natural progression, predictive
methods are emerging as a more accepted and practiced approach in political science
methodology. Scholarship on forecasting exploded in the 2010’s. Prediction has always been
something that is viewed as a serious goal within political science (Singer, 1973). However,
previous methods for prediction were somewhat out of reach.13

Prediction and Forecasting

Within the political science realm, the terms prediction and forecasting have different
meanings. As Hegre and colleagues outline, a prediction is an “assignment of a probability
distribution to an outcome based on such model estimates” whereas a forecast refers to
“predictions about unrealized outcomes given model estimates from realized data” (Hegre,

13

The forecasting/prediction being referred to is through large-N algorithmic data analysis. This excludes the efforts
by Tetlock to identify Superforecasters, which are less constrained by computational development.
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Metternich, Nygård, & Wucherpfennig, 2017, p. 114). In essence a forecast is about the future,
whereas a prediction can relate to a historical or future outcome. Predictive methods lead to
forecasts and forecasting in politics has faced suspicion given the dubious ability to get future
predictions correct (Jäger, 2016). For instance, the failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet
Republic has long been lauded as a failure of political scientists (Hopf & Gaddis, 1993). More
recent work has colloquially labeled expert political opinions equivalent to that of ‘dart throwing
chimps’ (Tetlock, 2017). It is no surprise then that efforts to forecast have been met with
hesitation.
Nevertheless, as Singer articulated, prediction (and by extension forecasting), remains an
important endeavor. Efforts to predict conflict and instability outcomes have become more
commonplace since 2010. The Political Instability Task Force, a major effort funded by the
United States Central Intelligence Agency, issued forecasts of political instability at the global
level (Goldstone, et al., 2010). This was an important attempt to provide open forecasts on
instability, and ultimately pivoted the field towards the use of predictive power (Bowlsby,
Chenoweth, Hendrix, & Moyer, 2019).
From this point, a “third generation” of forecasting has emerged with increased
methodological sophistication and outcome diversity (Bressan, Nygård, & Seefeldt, 2019). For
political scientists forecasting was a chance to expand exploratory findings to become
pragmatically useful. “The ability to predict future crises can be understood as the gold standard
to scientifically advance the study of conflict, peace, and crises” (Ward, et al., 2013, p. 481). And
the use of forecasts in probabilistic terms could provide a useful tool for policy practitioners
(Scharpf, Schneider, Nöh, & Clauset, 2014). In general, the debate over whether predictive
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methods have some place in the prediction of conflict outcomes has moved in favor (Ward,
2016; Cederman & Weidmann, 2017; Chadefaux, 2017). These attempts at prediction have
begun to leverage more complex computational tools such as a machine learning. These tools
help to increase the predictive capacity and model performance, granting more confidence in
forecasts.
Civil war outcomes found a resurgence of attention, both with backward focused
predictions (Ward, et al., 2013) and forecasts up to five decades in the future (Hegre, Karlsen,
Nygård, Strand, & Urdal, 2013; Hegre, et al., 2016). Scholars have implemented new algorithms
(Muchlinski, Siroky, He, & Kocher, 2016), and alternative sub-sampling strategies to increase
predictive performance (Colaresi & Mahmood, 2017). Alternative input features, such as
machine-coded event data, are also found to have improved usefulness in the prediction of civil
war (Chiba & Gleditsch, 2017). More recently a natural language technique of topic modeling,
has been added to the growing list of predictive features for civil war (Mueller & Rauh, 2018).
Formalized rebellions are not the only conflict outcome to receive increased predictive
efforts, however. Scholars also turned their attention to protests movements and non-violent
movements. Military presence and twitter activity were important for prediction of protests in the
Egyptian revolution (Wu & Gerber, 2017). Chenoweth and Ufelder took the important step of
assessing modeling metrics on a variety of feature subsets, finding that certain structural factors
such as regime type and durability are not very important for prediction (2017).
Sub-national violence not included in the formalized rebellion are also important for
prediction. These outcomes are argued to be a more functionally relevant area in forecasting as
opposed to huge events such as Brexit, and efforts can be more fruitful in comparison (Cederman
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& Weidmann, 2017). Forecasting into the future, Witmer and colleagues provide a number of
estimates for localized violence along various socio-economic pathways (2017). The most recent
attempt to forecast different types of political violence is the ViEWS Project which seeks to
forecast political violence particularly in Africa, at the country and prio-grid levels (Hegre, et al.,
2019).
This research builds on previous forecasting work and presents novel contributions to
best implement predictive methods and assess model quality. Early models tended to be single
classifier based and included only a small number of features (Goldstone, et al., 2010; Hegre,
Karlsen, Nygård, Strand, & Urdal, 2013). Since then conflict scholars have implemented more
advanced computational efforts to draw from numerous models, with the goal of adding to the
quality of prediction (Ward & Beger, 2017; Hegre, et al., 2019). Yet the machine learning
framework is multi-faceted, with decisions to be made at numerous steps. This study contributes
to previous research by identifying three primary areas for improvement, which is detailed
below.

Novel Innovations for Coup Prediction

This paper fits into a pragmatic prediction research programme (Dowding & Miller,
2019). Pragmatic prediction offers a number of useful implications for the field of civil-military
relations. First, it can begin to consolidate some of the existing findings for coup outcomes.
Second, it is one of the most impactful outcomes for political stability. Improving predictions of
these outcomes can inform policy and influence the livelihoods of citizens around the world.
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Finally, predicting coups broadly construed, is an effort that has already been undertaken. While
this may not seem to be particularly advantageous, pragmatic prediction benefits from replication
and extension in a manner that explanatory approaches do not.
At the time of writing this paper, three significant efforts have been made recently to
forecast military coups. Jay Ufelder constructed coup forecasts on his personal website most
recently for the year 2015 (Ulfelder, 2015). Ulfelder utilized an ensemble of logistic regressions
to estimate coup probabilities at the country-year level. This project utilized a number of
important predictors including infant mortality and election characteristics. Ufelder used a k-fold
cross validation technique and achieved an average AUC score of .761 on Powell and Thyne
coups across testing years. AUC is the area under the curve of receiver operating characteristic
and is a measure of true positive rate over false positive rate. In general, this is a common
measure for binary outcomes to assess model performance. This is a good AUC score; however,
it is the mean of the most recent three years predictions (2012-2014). This single average by
itself does not indicate the historical predictive capacity of the model and may be an outlier
rather than a norm.
Continuing in the predictive efforts Ward and Beger present a forecasting model for
Irregular Leader Change14 (2017). Ward and Beger build on a split-population duration
ensemble approach (Beger, Dorff, & Ward, 2014), and present estimates at the country-month
level. Beger, Dorff and Ward provided an overview in forecasting irregular leader change as part
of the Political Instability Task Force’s prediction efforts (2014). This paper extended the work

14

These include events like revolutions in addition to military coups. While this means that explanatory variables
are at times different given the underlying theoretical mechanisms, the overall methodological approach is
comparable regardless of the inclusion.
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of PITF and focused on irregular leader change, an outcome that encompasses military coups.
The outcome is transformed from a binary indicator of presence/non-presence, to a count of
months since the last occurrence. The authors construct thematic models and utilize Ensemble
Bayesian Model Averaging (EBMA) to combine them into a single prediction. This is a useful
technique because as the authors suggest it allows them to “dig into and describe the factors
driving high or low forecasts” (Ward & Beger, 2017, p. 144). In essence, the authors combine
thematic models (models that utilize some subset of theoretically important variables) and
estimate probabilities from the combination. Ensembles on the test country-months; May 2012 to
July 2015 achieve an AUC of 0.823.
Finally, the organization One Earth Future (OEF) provides a CoupCast forecast which
gives monthly predictions of military coups (http://oefresearch. org/activities/coup-cast). OEF
provides rolling predictions in real-time. OEF is also a consistent source of data on Rulers,
Election and Irregular Governance (Bell, 2016). Although the framework underlying forecasts
(and model metrics) are not open access, updates on important predictive features are often
featured in blogs and popular media (Economist, 2019).
These three predictive efforts together represent the most recent and robust attempts to
forecast coups.15 This paper builds on their combined work and presents an updated unified
framework for implementing forecasting methods in the context of military coups. The key
advances presented are three-fold; first a more temporally coherent cross-validation strategy is
presented, second an improvement on feature selection, and third an agnostic machine learning
15

Scholars have used things like coup risk to model other outcomes without building a predictive framework. A
composite index was developed for instance, by Belkin and Schofer (2003) and used as a predictor for progovernment militia presence (Carey, Colaresi, & Mitchell, 2016), and diversionary war (Powell J. M., 2014). Others
have used coup risk as a latent variable for coup outcomes (Sudduth, 2017).
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classifier ensemble implementation. These improvements culminate in comparable model
metrics to predecessors (Accuracy/AUC/Brier scores) and demonstrates the feasibility of
exploring the ‘black box’ of ML classifiers with partial dependence plots.
Temporal considerations while implementing cross-validation machine learning
strategies are not widely articulated or discussed in conflict and political instability research.
Most set a period for training and a smaller period for testing (Beger, Dorff, & Ward, 2014;
Chiba & Gleditsch, 2017; Hegre, Karlsen, Nygård, Strand, & Urdal, 2013; Hegre, et al., 2019).
This partitioning strategy has an innate issue given the nature of temporality. In time-series
forecasting, predicting tomorrow with yesterday’s data, serial correlation is an innate feature of
the data. Machine learning classifiers are not able to inherently account for this autocorrelation
when the partition is set at a single cut point in time. To mitigate this an alternative partitioning
strategy is used to better leverage information and predict coups.
Tashmann outlined a rolling-origin strategy where forecasts are generated from an origin
point T (2000). This strategy partitions data in a moving manner, bumping the origin point up
dynamically and generating models and metrics at each step. It has been used in combination
with machine learning classifiers such as KNN (Martıń ez, Frıá s, Pérez, & Rivera, 2019) and
shows increased ability to manage autocorrelations inherent in time-series data (Bergmeir,
Hyndman, & Koo, 2018). This method is computationally expensive; however, it grants
increased information regarding holistic predictive performance.
This strategy allows for a more logical selection of data points to use in the prediction of
coups. By training a model up to a certain point in time, then using that time span to predict
years immediately following it, the algorithm has a consistent reference for training and
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subsequent prediction. This strategy also creates the most optimal conditions for the ensemble
methods to better predict the presence of a coup. Moving beyond the technique for dividing the
data set, the selection of variables is important.
The inclusion or exclusion of variables has led to important and longstanding debates
across political science. Arguments over predictor importance have defined inter-state war and
peace scholarship (Oneal & Russet, 1997; Gartzke, 2007). Most research in the pragmatic
prediction vein of conflict and political instability, have tended to avoid arguments about which
variables to include and more often opt for thematic models (Ward & Beger, 2017; Hegre, et al.,
2019). This method makes sense given that it is less restrictive than the explanatory approaches,
and still holds on to the innate desire for theoretically motivated predictors.
The thematic approach can be improved on, and it makes sense to do so given the goal is
predictive performance. For instance, Ward and Beger outline a protest model and also an
internal conflict model (2017, p. 145). Each of these models will have predictors related to their
respective themes, but likely not overlapping. So, the number of protests in country X in year Y
will influence the ‘protest’s model’ prediction for year Y+1, but that model will not consider the
internal conflict. The effect of variation in internal conflict on the outcome of irregular leader
change will still be accounted for in the ‘internal conflict’ model, but these models are kept
separate. Their respective model predictions are ensembled together, but the information of the
variables is not stacked within the model. I argue this leads to a loss in predictive capacity.
To better leverage all available data, I implement a cross-validated sequential floating
feature selection approach. This method starts with the full range of predictive features and
sequentially subsets the features until the optimal combination is found. It has been found to be
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both computationally efficient and provide “optimal or a close to optimal” model result (Pudil,
Novovičová, & Kittler, 1994, p. 1125). Utilizing this approach if both protests and internal
conflict are combinatorically found to be useful in the prediction of a military coup, they would
be included in the model. While an exhaustive method for maximizing feature selection would
potentially improve model performance, the relative gains to increased computational intensity
make the approach less desirable.
In essence, rather than choosing a single variable or variable subset like previous studies,
this method chooses them all. Then it narrows down which variable subset is the best, by
continuously running models and comparing them. When an adequate number of models have
been estimated, the best model is selected. Whichever variable subset corresponds to the best
model is the one which is used for that particular partition of data. Estimating predictions on the
year 1960 will include all data from 1950-1959. The best variable subset may be just a single
variable. However, when getting predictions on 1961, the training data will include data from
1950-1960. The feature selection technique may find that the best model is one that contains ten
variables. This strategy is agnostic to particular variables, and instead only uses those which
work the best.
Lastly, this paper presents an ensemble approach that outperforms those articulated thus
far in coup prediction research. While it is more computationally intensive when combined with
the two previous additions (rolling origin cross-validation and sequential feature selection), it
provides a more robust set of models to draw wisdom from. The ensemble approach utilized is
stacking with K-fold cross validation. This is a generalized stacking method (Wolpert, 1992) and
is implemented as a second level meta-classifier (Li & Fan., 2015). This method has been shown
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to outperform Bayesian model averaging when the data contains noise (Clarke, 2003). In
practical terms, a series of models are constructed in the first level and predicted probabilities are
found for coup outcomes. These are then stacked together utilizing an additional classifier at the
second level, which is trained on the predicted probabilities. The final ensemble model generates
predictions in the same fashion and has consistent model metrics to those of other ensemble
implementations. Ensemble methods provide added utility in prediction. As previously
described, the feature selection technique could pick one or ten variables as the best model. By
adding a number of models based on different underlying assumptions, the best model for each
may include a variety of variables. The ensemble method then can build on a wide array of
models to culminate in the best possible prediction.
In total these three innovations build upon existing efforts to predictively model coups.
To better situate these in a comprehensive framework, I will discuss their methodological
implementations in the predictive framework. A thorough discussion of the methods involved for
coup forecasting is mentioned in the succeeding section. First, I discuss the features and
processing steps needed to prepare the data for modeling. Following, the steps for fitting
classifiers and performing necessary feature selection and model tuning are outlined. Finally,
models are combined through an ensemble stacking cross-validated meta-classifier. These steps
culminate in model metrics and predictive results.
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Features and Data Processing

A key step in the framework for prediction is compiling features for model input and
processing those variables. This process includes identifying, encoding, sub setting, imputation,
and scaling. Variables chosen or engineered must provide the most theoretical benefit to
predicting the onset of coup outcomes. These features are derived in large part from existing
studies on military coups. Some features are found in manners that are not conducive to
algorithmic estimation. For instance, a categorical variable such as government type with many
levels, might be useful but its inclusion must be numerically informative. Some variables are
missing, and the methods used to either subset or impute them are important for prediction.
Finally, variables that have large deviation or variance can affect the algorithm performance and
subsequently affect predictive capacity. Scaling features can help improve the overall forecasting
of military coups.
The predictors for military coups are derived primarily from existing coup literature.
Variables like time since coup and economic measures have been heavily relied upon in
quantitative studies of coups (Londregan & Poole, 1990). A broad set of features are selected;
however, they do not represent an exhaustive list of all variables used in coup studies. In general,
they are some of the most important. Variables on food security from Chapter Two, and coup
contagion from Chapter Three are also included. The full list of variables are given in Table 19 –
Feature Sources. While variables are derived from sources at a variety of temporal and spatial
resolutions, they are aggregated to the country-year level in the most logically consistent manner.
Additionally, the majority of features are lagged by a year, to mitigate the potential for
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endogeneity. Once the totality of features to include in the model are identified, ensuring their
valid numerical representation is the next step.
For variables which have multiple levels, but no numerical difference, a one-hot encoding
technique is implemented. For instance, the type of government has 13 different possibilities in
the data (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2014; Bell, 2016). These are transformed into 13 separate
columns each with a binary indicator. While this greatly increases the number of features
possibly included in the model, it does not necessarily mean they will be relied upon.16 This is
also done for variables that are typically found in econometric models that seek to nullify
omitted variable bias. Things such as year and country are included as binary indicators in the
model. With a full range of numerically valid features the variables are selected, and missing
data is managed.
Not all of the predictor variables are present in the data. Some data has a limited time
range, for instance the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) daily per capita food supply
measure spans 1961 to 2017.To deal with the missing values in the data two approaches are
taken. First, predictions are made on a number of subsets. Some data is available for the entirety
of the time span (1950-2020). Therefore, each country receives a prediction with the full, nonmissing, data. Then subsets of the data are selected based on missing data, and predictions are
assessed using this. With food data as an example, predictions are made on just the outcomes
available based on the non-missing data.
The second manner to deal with missing data is through imputation. This is the strategy
of filling missing values with a new value that is based on a particular method. Filling missing
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More on this in the feature selection aspect of modeling.

96

values with mean, median, or mode are some common imputation methods. To simulate the most
likely values, I utilize the K Nearest Neighbors (KNN) imputation method. This method has been
shown to be more useful in simulating robust and sensitive estimates (Troyanskaya, et al., 2001).
Using KNN allows for a most likely value to be imputed given the values which are present in
the most similar neighbors. Under this specification the algorithm matches a row with a most
similar row and imputes a value for the missing feature based on its neighbor’s value. An N=5
parameter is presented, where N is the number of neighbors to match, and then average across.
Other parameters are tested, but substantive results remain largely consistent.
With missing values dealt with, the data is nearly processed and ready for modeling. The
final step before fitting a model of coup outcomes, is transforming it so as not to bias predictions
due to unstable classifier algorithm parameter estimation. Scaling is the step concerned with
taking feature inputs and standardizing them. For instance, a common variable in models on
political instability; Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is included after applying the logarithmic
transformation. Taking the log of a value is one method for scaling. Presented below are models
with the standard scaling17 applied to features, however a range of alternative scalers are tested
for robustness. This improves model performance and can grant more stable parameter
estimation. Some models, such as logistic regression, are particularly biased by unscaled
features. Other models, such as the Random Forest Classifier, are less biased by data with high
variance. In order to systematize the process, the best practice is to scale all features. Scaling
features is not so much a question of if, as it is when.

17

Standard scaling is found with the equation:
scaled-value = (observation value - mean) / (standard deviation)
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The scaling must take place on the split data separately since this could influence the
algorithms performance. If scaling was done to the entire sample, information from the training
set may leak into the test set. Under such circumstances the problem of overfitting data becomes
more likely. Overfit models would not create a baseline for future predictive forecasting. This is
yet another step where practices can lead to overfitting and ultimately biased estimates. In order
to provide a systematic framework for predictive modeling of military coups, it is necessary to
avoid overfitting and biasing performance. I turn now to model fit within the ensemble
framework.

Ensemble Machine Learning Framework

At this stage we have constructed a data set18 that is processed and ready for model
estimation. Unlike an explanatory approach where a model (such as ordinary least squares) is fit
to the entirety of the data, forecasting methods utilize an alternative approach. To better avoid an
overfit of the data (Ward, Greenhill, & Bakke, 2010), a subset of the sample or out-of-sample, is
held out. This subset or split within the data, is the one which model metrics are extracted. Most
classifiers would be able to model data very well and get high metrics if they can fit the entire
population. This is called overfitting and as Silver states, is “the most important scientific
problem you’ve never heard of” (Silver, 2012, p. 154). To better understand the value of the

18

It is actually more accurate to say a number of data sets. This would be a series of subsets of data that are not

missing, variables scaled in different methods, in addition to a variety of imputed data sets. For simplicity however
the process will be explained as if it were on a single flat data set.
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model it must be tested on data which it has not seen before. This provides the key basis for
avoiding an overfit model.
When splitting data in the train-test manner, it is possible that the split is somehow nonrepresentative. This is even more likely the case for non-normally distributed data such as rare
events. For instance a K-Fold Cross Validation is often used to ensure that any arbitrary split of
the data is not oversampling some distribution of the data, inflating error in some way or creating
a model metric that is not representative of the algorithm's performance on the entire sample
(Kohavi & others, 1995). This method is different from that of the ‘leave-one-out’ crossvalidation strategy. In this alternative specification splits are conducted for the total number of
observations (Schutte, 2017). This method is computationally intense, and given the number of
features, observations, and classifiers, unfeasible in this instance.

Figure 10 – K-Fold Cross Validation
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Each iteration or fold of the data selects a different subset to be the out-of-sample (test)
group. Model metrics can be assessed (averaged) across all test sets to better tease out the
performance of the algorithm. Target data that is non-normally distributed (such as rare-event
data) provides another layer of complexity. For instance, let us take the above figure to be a
cross-sectional data frame of the year 2014, with our target feature being military coups. In this
example year, only four coups occurred. If we randomly selected one quarter of the data, it is
possible that all 4 of the coups are in the test subset. If that were the case then the model metrics
would reflect an algorithm that has never seen what a positive outcome looks like, and the model
would surely perform poorly. To deal with this it is possible to use a stratified K-Fold Cross
Validation technique. This method ensures that each of the test sets contain an equal distribution
of the outcome variable in order to provide more stable model metrics.
The task of forecasting coups requires the use of historical data. A typical partition of the
data will create some inconsistencies regarding time continuity. Serial correlation within data on
coups makes a typical K-Fold cross validation strategy inappropriate. A K-Fold may include data
from the future (i.e. Honduras food prices in 2010) to model an event that occurred in the past
(Honduras coup in 2009). From a theoretical standpoint this cross-validation method would
violate temporal cause and effect. To deal with this, I employ a rolling origin split technique with
a multi-year test window. This method has been shown to address some of the issues inherent in
serial autocorrelated data (Tashman, 2000; Bergmeir, Hyndman, & Koo, 2018). The split under
this strategy utilizes a moving origin to determine the test split within the data.
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This method allows for two important accommodations. First it alleviates the issue
previously highlighted. Data in the future will not be used to predict an event in the past. A
model predicting the year 2000 will only include targets and features of years preceding that
point. Second, this approach better leverages all available data and allows for predictive model
metrics to be derived at each step. Rather than constructing one model with metrics derived only
for the most recent years, a rolling origin technique generates more robust metrics. A crossvalidation split can still be performed; however, the out-of-sample group is always in the future.
This way the predictions used for testing a model’s validity will never be predicted by things in
the past. This method generates an opportunity for greater replicability and future comparisons.
The data being used is historical in nature, and ranges from 1950 to 2020. The splits are
constructed by setting an origin point. In order to have a starting point the first temporal unit
(year) is held out from testing. Thus, for example, the year 1950 is held out and no predictions
are made. The starting points are used only in the training data. 1951 is the first year in which
predictions are made at the country level for coup outcomes. The data to make these predictions
would be entirely derived from 1950.
As the origin is stepped up, new models are generated. The subsequent model would be
predictions for 1952. The training data for this model would include both 1950 and 1951. The
rolling origin technique proceeds in this manner for the entirety of the data. I chose to utilize a
three-year rolling window to ensure optimal model fits and reduce computational intensity. Also,
some years have no coups, under which case defining metrics will be less indicative of the
overall performance. By using a three-year step, model metrics are still comparable.
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With splits defined and data scaled respectively to each split, the modeling process
begins. This process occurs in two stages or levels, with predictions being generated at both.
While the step-1 process is done in a concurrent manner, it is easier to conceptualize it
chronologically. Classifier specifics will be discussed at length in the subsequent section, for
now a Support Vector Machine Classifier (SVC) will be used as an illustrative example for the
process.19 In terms of estimation, an SVC classifies data in a comparable manner to a logistic
regression.
First an instance of the SVC is created. This classifier is now ready to be fit with the
training data. But the training data itself contains a huge number of variables. Some of these are
very useful (time since coup), some are somewhat useful (perhaps GDP growth), and some may
not be useful at all (whether the country is a Party-Personal-Military Hybrid). Throwing
everything into the model may not actually be efficient and it can even reduce the ability for the
model to predict coups. By adding noisy data, we clutter the model and create biased predictions.
With all that added noise the SVC may perform badly and not aid in the step-2 predictions. To
attempt to add/drop variables manually is both practically infeasible and overall, less effective.
However, to artificially select, or even select based on thematic intuition, may obscure the actual
patterns existing in the data.
A cross-validated floating sequential feature selection approach is utilized to optimize
variable inclusion. This selection approach has a few advantages. First it is computationally less
expensive (Chandrashekar & Sahin, 2014). When running such large data, with many steps in the

19

Support Vector Machine classifiers differ from regressors such as those used by (Bonica, 2018), only in the
outcome they predict and not in their underlying assumptions.
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process, computational intensity becomes a concern. The sequential feature selection also allows
for a higher model performance on average by decreasing the noise present from data inputs
(Pudil, Novovičová, & Kittler, 1994). Both forward and backward, floating and non-floating,
feature selection methods are implemented. A backward floating feature selection works as such;
the SVC is fit with all of the features and model metrics are derived. The least important feature
is held out, and model metrics are compared to previous ones. This process continues until an
optimal (best) model is found. The subset of features that are utilized for the best model are then
fed-forward in the level-1 process. In essence, the model gets run repeatedly until the best set of
variables is found.
A shared process with feature selection, is that of hyper parameterization. If we think
about these chronologically, the SVC has now been fit with the best subset of variables. The
SVC classifier has a number of parameters which can be tuned in order to increase the overall
model’s performance. One such parameter is C which stands for regularization. Increasing the C
value will make the classifier less smooth in its fit of the outcome. In a sense, this is the
difference between a line which runs through each point on a graph, or the derivative which
displays a curve, smoothly partitioning two segments of the data. Much like the step of feature
selection, performing parameter tuning by hand is both inefficient and ineffective.
Instead, a process referred to as grid search is implemented. The grid is specifically a list
of parameters and their subsequent range of values. For instance, one key-value pair in the SVC
parameter grid is that of C : [0.1, 0.001, 10]. In this case, all three of the values 0.1, 0.001, and
10 are tested. This means that at minimum the classifier is fit to the data three different times,
and metrics are derived. If the SVC parameter grid includes another parameter with three values,
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the number of models becomes 3^2. Large parameter grids can increase model performance by
finding just the right parameter combinations, but also leads to some added calculation time.
Similar to feature selection, rather than telling the classifier beforehand what parameter to use,
this technique allows for the selection of the best parameters.
Both sequential feature selection and grid search have additional layers happening
concurrently. In order to ensure that the features and model parameters selected are actually the
best for predicting out-of-sample coups, a validation strategy is implemented. More specifically,
a stratified 5-fold validation strategy. The training data is partitioned into 5 folds, each with
positive coup occurrences stratified equally into the validation subsets. Feature selection is run
on each of the train-validate subsets, and the feature subset which does the best across all folds is
selected. This approach ensures that a particular subset of data is not dictating the variables being
used, and also keeps from an overfit model. Similarly, the grid search is performed across all five
folds. If, as mentioned before, the grid has two parameters with three values each, these nine
models are then tested across each of the five folds for a grand total of 45 models.
Once the SVC’s feature subset and optimal parameters are selected, it is then calibrated.
Since the primary goal is to assess and forecast a coup event, the outputs need to be reasonable to
a given distribution (Kuhn & Johnson, 2013, p. 249). Coups being rare events makes this step
particularly important. Not every classifier needs calibration, some are inherently more apt at
giving predictions that reflect target distributions. Logistic regressions, for instance, inherently
give predicted probabilities that mimic class probabilities. In general, an isotonic transformation
is used to better achieve this result (Niculescu-Mizil & Caruana, 2005). This calibration is also
performed utilizing a stratified k-fold cross validation method.
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This is the final step before gathering model metrics and predicted probabilities for
coups. These two components will be discussed at greater length in conjunction with the
equivalent procedures during the ensemble stage. I now turn to a brief overview of the level-1
classifiers used, before turning to the stacking algorithm and results.

Step-1 Classifiers

In the first stage of model estimation, a number of classifiers are passed through the
entirety of the process described above. Data is imputed/subsetted/split/scaled and then passed to
a given classifier. The steps of sequential feature selection and hyper parameterization are then
initiated. Finally, model metrics and predictions are assessed on the best model and stored for
use in the second stage. All first-level classifiers are implemented using the Scikit Learn Python
Package (Pedregosa, et al., 2011). Five algorithms are chosen to include in the ensemble. These
algorithms were chosen specifically because they represent a varied array of techniques with
which to estimate the binary outcome. Algorithms are both parametric and non-parametric and so
have a variety of pros and cons. Some are flexible, slower, and require greater data, while others
are fast but sometimes underperformers. In total the selection represents a range of potential
benefits and drawbacks to algorithms and by combining them, it allows for the most robust
predictions.
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KNN-Classifier

The K nearest neighbor algorithm is a non-parametric approach that enables it to be used
in a number of ways including imputation (Troyanskaya, et al., 2001). In essence the approach
finds neighbors which are closest to a referent point. Then based on a voting between nearest
neighbors (and weighting method), a class is predicted. Parameters for the KNN classifier
include the number of neighbors and weighting method. The number of neighbors indicates the
number of similar data points which the algorithm will draw from to identify a common
neighborhood. This value is continuous and generally ranges from 1 to 10. The weight measure
indicates the manner in which neighbors are weighted. This can be either uniform or distance
based. In distance based, neighbors are weighted based on the similarity to the data point being
classified. In the uniform specification all neighbors are weighted equally. An isotonic
transformation is used to calibrate the KNN classifier.

Naive Bayes

The naive bayes classifier is implemented with Bayes theorem considerations. Naive
bayes classifiers have been shown to perform well, particularly in text classification problems
(Rish & others, 2001; Zhang, 2004). This classifier does not have parameters to optimize. It does
need to be calibrated as it is generally poor estimating predicted probabilities. A binning method
is used to properly calibrate the NB classifier (Zadrozny & Elkan, 2001).
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Logistic Regression

The logistic regression is the most familiar of classifier methods in political science. It is
a binary classifier that is both computationally efficient and often does very well in prediction. It
is estimated using the logistic function. The logistic regression parameters include penalty, C,
and solver. Solver and penalty are conditional upon each other, with only some solvers being
utilized for particular penalty specification. Penalties include l1 and l2. Solvers include the
Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno algorithm, coordinate descent, and stochastic average
gradient descent . C refers to the regularization intensity and is a continuous value most often
ranging from .01 to 10. As mentioned, the logistic classifier does not require calibration for
useful predicted probabilities.

Random forest

The random forest classifier has seen some emergence as useful in the political science
literature. Muchlinski and colleagues found it to be useful in the prediction of civil conflict
(2016). More recently Tezcur and Besaw saw it usefully predict the differences among jihadist
foreign fighters in Syria (2020). The algorithm first developed by Breiman (2001), is a method
for combining decision tree classifiers together in a voting system. Trees are fitted with random
subsets of data and then assembled together to create a more useful classifier. Parameters
included in the random forest are number of estimators, maximum number of features, criterion,
and bootstrap. The number of estimators relates to the number of trees in the forest (number of
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individual random decision trees to include). This is a continuous number and generally ranges
from 10 to 1000. Maximum number of features refers to how many variables to include in each
decision tree. This parameter can be the square root of the number of features, a continuous
variable ranging from 1 to the maximum number of variables in the data, or the logarithmic
transformation of the number of total features. Random forest classifiers are calibrated using the
isotonic calibration method.

Support Vector Machine

Support vector machine classifiers is an algorithm that is particularly useful for highdimensionality data. SVM classifiers have been used to identify cancerous cells in tissue (Furey,
et al., 2000). The parameters optimized for SVM classifiers include C, kernel, and gamma. C
refers to the regularization intensity similar to logistic regressions, and ranges from .01 to 10.
The kernel is the estimator used and includes radial bias function, linear, polynomial, and
sigmoid. Gamma is the kernel coefficient and generally ranges from .01 to 10. The SVM
classifier does not output valid predictions on its own and must utilize an additional k-fold for
calibration using the Platt transformation (Platt & others, 1999).

Step-2 Ensemble

All step-1 classifiers are fit with the best parameters and features selected. With a varied
array of classifiers, it is possible to combine them in a ‘wisdom of the crowds’ effort to improve
prediction. The ensemble technique used is a stacking cross validated classifier provided by the
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Python package MLextend (Raschka, 2018). This approach is more computationally intense
because it seeks to reduce overfit issues. As a meta-classifier it takes the pre-built optimized
models and utilizes them to generate a new set of predictions on the out-of-sample split. A
technical formulation for this algorithm can be found in Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery
Series (Li & Fan., 2015, p. 500).
The second level classifier takes all of the information from the first level and combines
it into one output. Each classifier is given a full range of inputs and parameters to choose from.
While a logistic regression may choose four input variables, a random forest might have twenty
or vice versa. The predictions from each of these models will invariably differ. The combination
of all of these models, which like thematic models used previously (Ward & Beger, 2017; Hegre,
et al., 2019), approximates a wide range of potentialities. These possibilities combine to give a
better estimate of predicted coup probability.
The second level ensemble is not based off of class predictions, but class probabilities.
This is an important distinction given the coup outcome. Rarely will a coup be predicted,
particularly if the threshold for prediction is .5 (the standard). Guessing no coup all the time
would lead to a 99% accuracy. Given the class imbalance specifying an ensemble that votes
based on coup occurrence predictions would lead to a classifier that just predicts no coup.
Instead, the model ensembles together the predicted probabilities of coups. Therefore, if all step
1 classifiers have relatively high probability for a coup to occur (high being 10% or greater), the
step 2 ensemble will reflect that. In contrast if all classifiers predict a low probability (close to 0),
the ensemble will invariably predict the same. This grants the ensemble increased sensitivity to
the outcome. Since models at the first step are chosen based on a balanced accuracy measure
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(one that accounts for how sensitive the classifier is to predicting coup outcomes), the best
models will prioritize features and parameters that pick up on signals that tend to indicate coups.
In summation, the ensemble method will generate predictions that are overall more sensitive to
the rare event and produce predicted probabilities that are more accurate. This leads into a
discussion of particular model metrics that are important, what predictions look like, and what
can be taken out of the ‘black box’ of machine learning algorithms.

Predictions

While forecasting the future is the primary goal of the machine learning framework,
predictions of the past form the justification for their validity. A model that cannot make
accurate historical predictions, leads to a less confident forecast. To assess the model's overall
performance, we need to consider how it does over time. One way to do this would be to
average model metrics over time. Things like Receiver Operating Characteristic could
hypothetically be averaged over time to get an estimation of how the model performs (something
similar takes place in cross-validation). I will give overall diagnostics in conjunction with the
forecasts at the end of the results section. To begin with I will review a series of points in time
and assess the model’s performance relative to predicting particular coup attempts.
One measure that is a good catch-all for classifier model fit is the area under the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC). This method for model evaluation has been around for some
time and is used across fields (Hanley & McNeil, 1982). The ROC curve is an XY plot where the
Y indicates the true positive rate, and the X axis indicates the false positive rate. In political
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science it is used more commonly of late particularly in machine learning prediction (Chenoweth
& Ulfelder, 2017; Muchlinski, Siroky, He, & Kocher, 2016; Tezcür & Besaw, 2020; Ward &
Beger, 2017). The AUC measure ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being equivalent to perfect
prediction. A .5 score indicates a random guess, so models around that are not useful. Typically
scores above .7 are fair, with .8 and larger indicating good models. I turn now to a closer look at
specific years over time to better illustrate the predictive models at work. The years selected
represent together an overall average of the framework’s predictive capacity. The model does
good in some temporal snapshots (1976, 2000), bad (2012), and average (1966,1989) overall
representing an illustrative range. A full year-by-year description is not useful for the purposes of
the paper, although metrics are displayed in the Forecasts section.

1966
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Figure 11 – 1966 Geographical Predictions

The year 1966 witnessed the most coups in a year ever (17 in total). Eleven of these
coups succeeded, causing a significant amount of political instability. Models that had 1966 as
the out-of-sample, did fairly well at predicting coup attempts. The ensemble model had the
highest ROC-AUC with a score of 0.792. The SVM classifier and Logistic Regression model did
fair on both ROC-AUCs above 0.74. Of the fourteen countries that witnessed coups, all except
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two were found in the top forty highest predicted probabilities (Sudan and Laos were just above
that mark). Nigeria (most likely) and Argentina (third highest) had extremely high probabilities
even in comparison with all models. The ensemble model for 1966 had Nigeria with a .55
predicted probability and Argentina at .38. These values were likely influenced by some
important predictors. One feature particularly important for predictions in 1966 was Per Capita
GDP. Both Nigeria and Argentina were well below average with sub 4000$ GDP per capita.
Above the 5000$ level the effect becomes unimportant for coup prediction. Below that level
however we see a drastic increase in the likelihood of a coup.

Figure 12 – 1966 Feature Effects

In total the models for 1966 give a strong indication that coups were well predicted
during this period. The relative frequency of coups also makes the task of prediction slightly
easier, however the generally higher predicted probabilities for countries in this year is indicative
that the data contained some signal for coup prevalence.
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1976

Figure 13 – 1976 Geographical Predictions

1976 was another high coup frequency year. Eleven total coups took place across as
many countries. Although the 1966 sample had more coups take place, the models did an overall
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better job of predicting coup attempts in 1976. The ensemble model again had the best model
metrics with a ROC-AUC score of 0.842. Both the logistic regression and naive bayes classifier
also did well at predicting coups with ROC-AUCs over .80. Ten of eleven coup-witnessing
countries were found in the top forty (Central Africa Republic is the missing member at just a .08
probability), and three were in the top five of highest probabilities (Uruguay .269, Ecuador .267,
Nigeria .263). A new feature became particularly important for prediction in 1976, the amount of
food available to the average person in a country. As caloric supply increases the probability of a
country witnessing a coup attempt drastically decreases. Many of the countries that witnessed
coups this year were facing food shortages. Nigeria for instance, was below 2000 kilocalories per
person. Food supply per person had an important effect on assigning Nigeria such a high
predicted probability for a coup attempt.

Figure 14 – 1976 Feature Effects
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1989

Figure 15 – 1989 Geographical Predictions

1989 saw nine coups across the world. This remains a relatively large number of coups
to witness in a given year. Eight of the nine countries were found in the top forty most likely to
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witness a coup (Paraguay was the outlier with a .0177 probability). Overall models were less
sensitive to predicting coups in this year, with the ensemble model still performing the best at a
ROC-AUC of 0.779. The logit classifier and naive bayes were the two top performers overall
besides the ensemble. Guatemala was the highest predicted probability among countries that
witnessed coups at .261 (third overall). A normal host of features remained important such as
food supply, contagion, and coup spell, along with an additional feature. The military
expenditure per soldier became a particularly important variable for predicting coups in 1989.
Guatemala and Chad (.195), were both substantially below average on military expenditure. This
feature contributed to their higher predicted probabilities in this year.

Figure 16 – 1989 Feature Effects

2000
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Figure 17 – 2000 Geographical Predictions

The year 2000 witnessed eight coups. While this remains a fairly high number of coups,
the model has begun to become more cognizant of the rarity of coups. In the 1966 model, coup
attempt probabilities ranged up to .55 in Nigeria. However, in 2000, the ensemble predictions
only grant a maximum of .2 predicted probability for a coup attempt, and overall, the average
predicted probability is half of what it was in 1966. This mirrors the decline of coups over time
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and indicates the overall model’s learning. While only six of the eight countries that witnessed
coups rank in the top forty, overall, the ensemble model does a good job of prediction with a
ROC-AUC of 0.834. The random forest classifier and the logistic regression do well at
prediction as well both with ROC-AUCs above 0.75. Interestingly, the random forest algorithm
had a best feature set of just three predictors, GDP per capita, coup spell, and the presence of a
recent qualifying non-referendum election. Unlike many other algorithms, at times the RFC will
subset to a very small feature set in order to maximize predictions. In this case just three
variables grant it important predictive power.
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2012

Figure 18 – 2012 Geographical Predictions

In 2012 the fewest number of coups so far took place. Just six coups across five
countries occurred, a better year for political stability compared to those examined previously.
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This is also the single worst year for out-of-sample coup prediction with an ensemble ROC-AUC
of just 0.723. Only three of the five countries appear in the top forty overall, however Guinea
Bissau does rank second in coup likelihood. Predicted probabilities continue their downward
trend with lower predictions on average. Even with ensemble modeling predictions for 2012
were generally poor. While the 2012 out-of-sample prediction metrics do not instill confidence,
the models do improve somewhat going forward and hover around the 0.8 measure for ROCAUC indicating it is a good model overall. I turn now to an assessment of the models overall and
forecasts for 2020.

Forecasts

In general, the ensemble classification of military coups achieved a good ROC-AUC
score with an average of 0.78. This is across all years in the sample with the exception of 19501953 which are held out to ensure enough training data to generate models. The models do vary
pretty significantly over time. Some years have extremely high ROC-AUC values indicating
high performing models. One such year is 2008 which has a .91 ROC-AUC. In contrast some
years the classifiers perform very poorly such as 2005 with a sub .7 score. This variation is to be
expected as features that are good predictors in some cases may not be as strong during particular
periods. As Bowlsby and colleagues exhibit, prediction for one decade does not indicate
forecasting accuracy in the next (2019).
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Figure 19 – ROC-AUC over time

As the ROC-AUC demonstrates the scores vary over time, but in general stay above .75
and at times are above .8. This is a strong indication that prediction utilizing the ensemble
methods are in fact working. One additional measure can be useful in assessing how the model is
performing. Brier scores are often utilized to assess a model's calibration (Brier, 1950). These
have also been used in political science forecasting (Ward & Beger, 2017). In the brier score
utilized, it can range from 0 to 1. A larger number indicates that the model is not accurately
predicting probabilities, whereas a 0 would indicate a perfect model. This score is important,
particularly when assessing the model’s growth over time. For the current work, models focused
on predicting the 1960’s have a tremendous amount less data to train on when compared to that
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of the 21st century. While the ability to accurately predict coups is itself a tall task given the
rarity, we should expect a model to improve in its probabilities over time.

Figure 20 – Brier Score over time

The above figure illustrates the change in brier score over time. While ROC-AUC scores
exhibit a general volatility while maintaining an overall average line around .78, the brier score
has a clear negative trend line. This indicates that over time the models become better calibrated
to probability prediction. This is indicated in the changes in yearly maps above. While on
average probabilities were higher in the 60’s and 70’s, the 2000’s saw an overall decrease.
Given the extra information the ensemble models became more sensitive to the class imbalance
of military coups, and the predicted probabilities reflected this. This lends to the overall
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confidence in forecasting into the future, the primary aim of the ensemble machine learning
framework.

2020

Figure 21 – 2020 Geographical Forecasts

2020 forecasts put Thailand in first for predicted coup probability, followed closely by
Tunisia, and then Somalia, Burundi, and Ethiopia. The random forest classifier was performing
the best in the most recent years. The variables that are the most important include percent
change in GDP, food supply, and tenure months of a leader. Thailand has witnessed a decrease in
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percent GDP change, which likely has something to do with its high predicted probability. In
general, the predicted probabilities are again lower than earlier in the data. Still many countries
have a non-trivial predicted probability. Turkey ranks as the twenty-fourth most likely to have a
coup according to the ensemble model. Even an attempted coup in Turkey would have wide
ranging impacts across the region.
Tunisia represents an interesting case for a high prediction. The epicenter of the Arab
Spring instituted a new government in February of 2020 that is based on a diverse coalition.
Tunisia has not had a coup since 1987, and democratization attempts have taken place since
2011. However, 2018 economic hardship has fueled renewed civil discontent (Abouaoun, 2020).
Riots have increased substantially into 2020 according to ACLED (Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, &
Karlsen, 2010). And while the military was mostly powerless before the revolution in 2011, they
have seen a significant increase in power since (Grewal, 2019). While the country is listed as
food secure, much of the poor rural population is still vulnerable (Tunisia World Food
Programme). The center of the country is also where most of the military recruits from. This
identification with rural communities may have been a part of why military entities refused to
violently repress protestors in 2017. Another argument is that corporate interests were a source
of the military disobedience (Grewal, 2019). If this is the case, then the military may be more
likely to initiate a coup if their civil discontent continues.
While these forecasts are not meant to be prescriptive, they can serve as focal points for
deeper investigations and closer attention paid to particular countries. Given the models
performance in the past, and the increasing probability calibration, greater confidence can be had
in the ensemble estimates. Additionally, the feature selection approach taken creates an
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opportunity to link forecasts to policy application. For instance, knowing the most important
determinants at different time periods allows for a more integrated picture of coup determinants.
A hypothesis test across a global sample for a particular variable, such as GDP per capita, will
likely turn back a negative relationship (as wealth increases coup-likelihood decreases). This
however may obscure a more nuanced relationship. Wealth might be an important predictor for
coups, but if algorithmic feature selection begins to prefer to leave wealth out in models closer to
the origin point, it may confer a different expectation. In summation, assessing the features of
importance across a variety of out-of-sample splits, generates increased confidence in which
indicators are of particular interest in a forecast period.
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Figure 22 – 2020 Highest At-Risk
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Discussion

This paper has set out to outline a framework for ensemble military coup forecasting. I
have articulated three novel methodological improvements to existing work. A method for crossvalidation that grants both leverage over temporal autocorrelation, and also improved confidence
in cumulative model metrics, was demonstrated. A sequential feature selection algorithm was
implemented, and this helped to create useful insights into variable importance over time, in
addition to improving model performance. Identifying when food supply, contagion, or
economic indicators are particularly important can help better uncover the theoretical linkages
underlying these variables. Additionally, an ensemble stacking method was used as a metaclassifier to draw in the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ from step-1 classifiers. In sum, a rigorous
computational approach to historical prediction is made in order to better forecast future military
coups.
Only one true positive case is comparable across the four studies that attempt to forecast
coup events. Burkina Faso in 2015 witnessed a failed coup attempt just one year after a success.
All four forecasts have Burkina Faso at high risk in the out-of-sample forecasts. Jay Ufelder has
Burkina Faso as the fifth highest in coup risk among all countries at around 1.5% (Ulfelder,
2015). The ensemble Bayesian model averaging of thematic models technique has Burkina Faso
as the 12th most likely country for an irregular leader change at 2.7% (Ward & Beger, 2017).
Finally, CoupCast has Burkina Faso in the month preceding the coup as the second highest
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predicted probability in all of 2015 at 2.2% (Bell, 2016).20 The ensemble model described above
produced a value of 21% for Burkina Faso in 2015. In this anecdotal case the model has given a
higher predicted probability.
In contrast all four studies got Central African Republic wrong. All forecasts had CAR as
particularly high in risk ranked as 2, 8, 1, and 1, respectively. However, CAR was plagued by
instability and violence. Delayed elections and the potential for violence drove fears that an
attempt on the executive would take place. At one point an outbreak of violence spurred calls for
the resignation of transitional president Catherine Samba-Panza (Murray & Mangan, 2017). This
wrong prediction exhibited many indicators that point to a high coup risk. These events are rare
and given the low probabilities that are assigned even the most at-risk reflect that. The high
relative risk in the case of CAR in hindsight is well placed.
Explanatory quantitative approaches have formed the vast majority of 20th century social
science scholarship. Predictive methods, and forecasting by extension, are gaining traction as
more advanced computational methods pioneered in other disciplines become increasingly
accessible. This research attempts to set a baseline for predictive modeling that can be further
expanded going forward. The model metrics allow opportunity for direct comparison by future
scholars. While the forecast window will necessarily change, the model’s performance and
features of importance can be re-examined precisely. Forecasts will become an increasing part of
conflict and stability studies. Future research should expand on the methods to incorporate a
wide array of features and algorithms to predict outcomes.

20

The GitHub repo contains historical data on forecasts https://oefdatascience.github.io/REIGN.github.io/, currently
run by project manager Clayton Besaw.
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APPENDIX A: FOOD INSECURITY AND COUPS
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Figure 23 – Food Measure Correlations
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Table 6 – Food Supply Components 1
Coup Attempt
(1)

(2)

(3)

Animal protein (kilocalories per person per day) -0.168
(0.151)
Plant protein (kilocalories per person per day)
-0.175**
(0.076)
Fat (kilocalories per person per day)
-0.156
(0.142)
Carbohydrates (kilocalories per person per day)

(4)

(5)

-0.07
(0.076)
-0.506**
(0.212)

Other (kilocalories per person per day)

-0.162***
(0.038)
-0.292**
(0.117)
-0.017
(0.054)
-0.0
(0.184)
0.6***
(0.173)
0.084
(1.015)

-0.152***
(0.038)
-0.372***
(0.092)
-0.027
(0.054)
-0.069
(0.183)
0.531***
(0.175)
0.897
(0.731)

-0.162*** -0.159***
(0.038) (0.038)
-0.3*** -0.348***
(0.114) (0.096)
-0.018 -0.023
(0.054) (0.053)
-0.005 -0.03
(0.183) (0.182)
0.578*** 0.575***
(0.173) (0.174)
0.17
0.654
(0.971) (0.766)

-0.164***
(0.038)
-0.255**
(0.107)
-0.036
(0.055)
0.051
(0.185)
0.514***
(0.177)
-0.181
(0.893)

-0.205*
(0.117)
-0.165***
(0.038)
-0.248**
(0.119)
-0.033
(0.053)
0.041
(0.187)
0.601***
(0.176)
-0.161
(0.987)

5561.0
0.145
-824.13
1666.26
1725.88

5561.0
0.147
-822.05
1662.1
1721.71

5561.0
0.145
-824.16
1666.32
1725.94

5451.0
0.149
-790.11
1598.22
1657.65

5451.0
0.147
-791.77
1601.53
1660.97

Sugar (kilocalories per person per day)
Time Since
GDP pc(ln)
Military Exp (ln)
Democracy
Cold War
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

(6)

5561.0
0.145
-824.35
1666.71
1726.32
*

Note:
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p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7 – Food Supply Components 2
Coup Attempt
(1)
Oils & Fats (kilocalories per person per day)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.02
(0.107)

Meat (kilocalories per person per day)

-0.016
(0.122)
-0.315**
(0.14)

Dairy & Eggs (kilocalories per person per day)
Fruits & Vegetables (kilocalories per person per day)

0.045
(0.057)

Starchy Roots (kilocalories per person per day)

0.071
(0.053)

Pulses (kilocalories per person per day)
Time Since
GDP pc(ln)
Military Exp (ln)
Democracy
Cold War
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

(6)

-0.166*** -0.166***
(0.038) (0.038)
-0.375*** -0.375***
(0.103) (0.108)
-0.028 -0.027
(0.053) (0.053)
-0.019
-0.02
(0.185) (0.185)
0.58*** 0.583***
(0.176) (0.176)
0.934
0.936
(0.839) (0.914)

-0.163***
(0.038)
-0.229**
(0.114)
-0.029
(0.053)
0.057
(0.186)
0.592***
(0.176)
-0.394
(0.963)

-0.166*** -0.164***
(0.038) (0.038)
-0.396*** -0.359***
(0.095) (0.096)
-0.028 -0.035
(0.053) (0.053)
-0.025 -0.011
(0.184) (0.185)
0.574*** 0.572***
(0.176) (0.176)
1.126
0.858
(0.757) (0.753)

-0.091
(0.066)
-0.164***
(0.038)
-0.42***
(0.098)
-0.032
(0.053)
-0.009
(0.185)
0.596***
(0.176)
1.333*
(0.778)

5451.0
0.145
-793.3
1604.6
1664.03

5451.0
0.148
-790.63
1599.26
1658.69

5451.0
0.145
-793.02
1604.04
1663.47

5451.0
0.146
-792.29
1602.58
1662.01

5451.0
0.145
-793.31
1604.61
1664.04

*

5451.0
0.146
-792.44
1602.87
1662.31

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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Table 8 – Food Supply Components 3
Coup Attempt
(1)
Cereals & Grains (kilocalories per person per day)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.07
(0.067)

Alcoholic Beverages (kcal/person/day)

-0.058
(0.097)

fish and seafood (kg)

0.099
(0.131)

fruit (kilograms per person)

0.053
(0.059)

Bananas

-0.023
(0.051)

-0.164***
(0.038)
-0.383***
(0.094)
-0.032
(0.053)
-0.029
(0.185)
0.552***
(0.178)
1.056
(0.744)

-0.167***
(0.038)
-0.354***
(0.1)
-0.027
(0.054)
-0.022
(0.186)
0.592***
(0.177)
0.757
(0.809)

-0.168*** -0.168***
(0.038) (0.038)
-0.405*** -0.4***
(0.097) (0.094)
-0.026 -0.023
(0.053) (0.053)
-0.039 -0.039
(0.182) (0.182)
0.591*** 0.586***
(0.173) (0.174)
1.211
1.132
(0.785) (0.75)

-0.172***
(0.039)
-0.44***
(0.099)
-0.023
(0.054)
0.031
(0.189)
0.618***
(0.18)
1.398*
(0.779)

0.149*
(0.089)
-0.154***
(0.039)
-0.37***
(0.097)
-0.036
(0.06)
-0.049
(0.192)
0.69***
(0.187)
0.89
(0.785)

5451.0
0.146
-792.78
1603.55
1662.98

5410.0
0.144
-792.78
1603.57
1662.93

5491.0
0.147
-812.27
1642.55
1702.05

5247.0
0.149
-755.8
1529.61
1588.7

5241.0
0.151
-747.96
1513.93
1573.01

Dates
Time Since
GDP pc(ln)
Military Exp (ln)
Democracy
Cold War
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

(6)

5491.0
0.147
-812.17
1642.35
1701.85
*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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Table 9 – Food Supply Components 4
Coup Attempt
(1)
Citrus, other

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

*

0.094
(0.049)

Oranges & Mandarins

0.046
(0.105)
-0.393**
(0.181)

Apples

0.261***
(0.097)

Lemons & Limes
Grapes

0.005
(0.062)

Grapefruit
-0.162***
(0.042)
-0.362***
(0.101)
-0.013
(0.061)
-0.13
(0.2)
0.696***
(0.201)
0.614
(0.83)

-0.173***
(0.038)
-0.421***
(0.103)
-0.026
(0.053)
-0.041
(0.182)
0.584***
(0.174)
1.356
(0.834)

-0.166*** -0.174***
(0.038) (0.039)
-0.251** -0.498***
(0.108) (0.103)
-0.018 -0.037
(0.053) (0.056)
0.024
-0.015
(0.181) (0.186)
0.594*** 0.543***
(0.174) (0.177)
-0.288 2.086**
(0.928) (0.829)

-0.168***
(0.038)
-0.389***
(0.098)
-0.024
(0.053)
-0.029
(0.181)
0.597***
(0.173)
1.036
(0.773)

-0.17
(0.25)
-0.165***
(0.04)
-0.389***
(0.101)
-0.012
(0.06)
0.001
(0.197)
0.752***
(0.194)
0.768
(0.82)

Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

4961.0
0.158
-665.04
1348.09
1406.67

5442.0
0.15
-801.9
1621.8
1681.22

5491.0
0.149
-809.79
1637.57
1697.07

5491.0
0.146
-812.55
1643.1
1702.6

5156.0
0.154
-710.51
1439.02
1497.95

Note:

*

Time Since
GDP pc(ln)
Military Exp (ln)
Democracy
Cold War
Constant

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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5269.0
0.155
-764.85
1547.71
1606.83

Table 10 – Food Supply Components 5
Coup Attempt
(1)
Pineapples

(2)

(3)

0.168***
(0.064)

Plantains

0.057
(0.063)

-0.166***
(0.039)
GDP pc(ln)
-0.422***
(0.097)
Military Exp (ln) -0.025
(0.054)
Democracy
-0.036
(0.184)
Cold War
0.593***
(0.182)
Constant
1.318*
(0.776)

-0.171***
(0.045)
-0.378***
(0.123)
-0.049
(0.065)
-0.284
(0.235)
0.424*
(0.229)
1.455
(0.98)

0.17*
(0.096)
-0.166***
(0.038)
-0.417***
(0.095)
-0.02
(0.054)
-0.075
(0.184)
0.584***
(0.174)
1.278*
(0.754)

Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

5316.0
0.155
-766.34
1550.68
1609.89

3857.0
0.191
-499.66
1017.31
1073.63

5491.0
0.148
-811.06
1640.12
1699.62

Note:

*

Fruits, other
Time Since

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 11 – Food Prices 1
Coup Attempt
(1)
Tea

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

*

0.136
(0.071)

Sugar

0.044
(0.052)

Peanuts

0.117
(0.079)

Palm oil

0.093
(0.067)

Coffee

-0.001
(0.065)

Cocoa
-0.181*** -0.182***
(0.036) (0.036)
GDP pc(ln)
-0.425*** -0.408***
(0.082) (0.081)
Military Exp (ln) -0.011 -0.038
(0.051) (0.046)
Democracy
-0.193 -0.165
(0.165) (0.164)
Cold War
0.378** 0.425***
(0.147) (0.147)
Constant
1.374** 1.466**
(0.633) (0.625)

-0.18***
(0.036)
-0.425***
(0.083)
-0.014
(0.052)
-0.176
(0.165)
0.37**
(0.153)
1.402**
(0.631)

-0.18*** -0.184***
(0.036) (0.036)
-0.419*** -0.402***
(0.082) (0.081)
-0.025 -0.041
(0.049) (0.046)
-0.169
-0.17
(0.164) (0.164)
0.39*** 0.453***
(0.15) (0.146)
1.45** 1.452**
(0.627) (0.626)

-0.059
(0.065)
-0.186***
(0.036)
-0.396***
(0.081)
-0.043
(0.046)
-0.177
(0.164)
0.496***
(0.151)
1.413**
(0.627)

Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

6565.0
0.151
-993.28
2004.55
2065.66

6565.0
0.151
-993.44
2004.89
2065.99

6565.0
0.15
-993.96
2005.92
2067.03

Time Since

6565.0
0.151
-992.57
2003.15
2064.25

6565.0
0.15
-994.04
2006.08
2067.18

*

6565.0
0.15
-994.38
2006.76
2067.86

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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Table 12 – Food Prices 2
Coup Attempt
(1)
Wheat

(2)

(3)

(4)

**

0.139
(0.067)

Rye

0.064
(0.063)

Rice

0.094
(0.065)

Corn
-0.178***
(0.036)
GDP pc(ln)
-0.431***
(0.083)
Military Exp (ln) -0.011
(0.051)
Democracy
-0.184
(0.165)
Cold War
0.395***
(0.145)
Constant
1.396**
(0.631)

-0.18***
(0.036)
-0.416***
(0.082)
-0.028
(0.049)
-0.172
(0.164)
0.445***
(0.143)
1.432**
(0.628)

0.107
(0.069)
-0.181*** -0.179***
(0.036) (0.036)
-0.419*** -0.425***
(0.082) (0.082)
-0.025 -0.019
(0.049) (0.05)
-0.165 -0.173
(0.164) (0.165)
0.378** 0.403***
(0.152) (0.146)
1.451** 1.423**
(0.627) (0.629)

Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

6565.0
0.15
-993.88
2005.76
2066.87

6565.0
0.151
-993.38
2004.76
2065.87

Time Since

Note:

6565.0
0.152
-992.27
2002.54
2063.65

*

6565.0
0.151
-993.19
2004.38
2065.49

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 13 – Food Prices 3
Coup Attempt
(1)
Barley

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.059
(0.063)

Pork

0.089
(0.091)

Beef

-0.067
(0.1)

Lamb
-0.181***
(0.036)
GDP pc(ln)
-0.412***
(0.081)
Military Exp (ln) -0.034
(0.047)
Democracy
-0.166
(0.164)
Cold War
0.436***
(0.144)
Constant
1.462**
(0.626)

-0.181***
(0.036)
-0.413***
(0.081)
-0.035
(0.047)
-0.159
(0.165)
0.333*
(0.188)
1.512**
(0.629)

-0.099
(0.071)
-0.183*** -0.183***
(0.036) (0.036)
-0.401*** -0.409***
(0.081) (0.081)
-0.041
-0.03
(0.046) (0.048)
-0.18
-0.19
(0.165) (0.165)
0.572** 0.573***
(0.226) (0.167)
1.385** 1.332**
(0.634) (0.636)

Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

6565.0
0.15
-993.9
2005.81
2066.91

6565.0
0.15
-994.15
2006.3
2067.41

Time Since

Note:

6565.0
0.15
-993.95
2005.9
2067.01

*

6565.0
0.151
-993.41
2004.83
2065.93

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Figure 24 – Contagion Correlations
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Table 14 – Neighborhood Measures
Indicator Format

(X1,X2,X3)

X1

Q == Queen

R = Rook

K = K Nearest
Neighbors

X2

R = Row

B = Binary

V = Variance
Stabilizing

X3

3,4,5

# of Nearest Neighbors
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10,20

Kern = Kernel

Kernel Bandwidth

Table 15 – Contagion Rook Results
Coup Attempt
(1)
Coup Contagion (R,R)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.123
(0.067)
0.127*
(0.071)

Attempt Contagion (R,R)

0.134**
(0.068)

Coup Contagion (R,B)

0.127*
(0.075)

Attempt Contagion (R,B)

0.137**
(0.067)

Coup Contagion (R,V)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.437***
(0.081)
-0.043
(0.046)
-0.113
(0.162)
0.547***
(0.144)
1.55**
(0.623)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.431***
(0.081)
-0.044
(0.046)
-0.103
(0.161)
0.568***
(0.146)
1.499**
(0.626)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.431***
(0.081)
-0.048
(0.046)
-0.119
(0.162)
0.546***
(0.144)
1.549**
(0.621)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.429***
(0.081)
-0.047
(0.046)
-0.108
(0.162)
0.56***
(0.145)
1.517**
(0.622)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.432***
(0.081)
-0.049
(0.046)
-0.118
(0.162)
0.542***
(0.143)
1.556**
(0.622)

0.137*
(0.074)
-0.162***
(0.035)
-0.426***
(0.082)
-0.049
(0.046)
-0.107
(0.161)
0.562***
(0.145)
1.503**
(0.624)

6567.0
0.147
-1011.28
2040.57
2101.68

6567.0 6567.0
0.147
0.147
-1011.41 -1011.11
2040.82 2040.22
2101.93 2101.33

6567.0
0.146
-1011.6
2041.2
2102.31

6567.0
0.147
-1010.93
2039.86
2100.97

6567.0
0.147
-1011.25
2040.51
2101.62

Attempt Contagion (R,V)
Time Since
GDP pc(ln)
Military Exp (ln)
Democracy
Cold War
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

(6)

*

*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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Table 16 – Contagion Queen Results
Coup Attempt
(1)
Coup Contagion (Q,R)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.142
(0.07)

0.135*
(0.074)

Attempt Contagion (Q,R)

0.128*
(0.069)

Coup Contagion (Q,B)
Attempt Contagion (Q,B)

0.115
(0.074)
0.136**
(0.069)

Coup Contagion (Q,V)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.434***
(0.081)
-0.046
(0.046)
-0.113
(0.162)
0.553***
(0.144)
1.55**
(0.622)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.433***
(0.081)
-0.047
(0.046)
-0.103
(0.161)
0.571***
(0.146)
1.538**
(0.622)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.427***
(0.082)
-0.046
(0.046)
-0.102
(0.161)
0.562***
(0.146)
1.496**
(0.624)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.427***
(0.081)
-0.05
(0.046)
-0.114
(0.162)
0.547***
(0.143)
1.524**
(0.622)

0.127*
(0.073)
-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.427***
(0.082)
-0.049
(0.046)
-0.102
(0.161)
0.564***
(0.145)
1.509**
(0.623)

6567.0
0.147
-1010.94
2039.89
2101.0

6567.0 6567.0 6567.0
0.147
0.147
0.146
-1011.34 -1011.33 -1011.78
2040.69 2040.66 2041.55
2101.79 2101.77 2102.66

6567.0
0.147
-1011.06
2040.13
2101.23

6567.0
0.147
-1011.48
2040.97
2102.08

Attempt Contagion (Q,V)
Time Since
GDP pc(ln)
Military Exp (ln)
Democracy
Cold War
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

(6)

**

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.425***
(0.082)
-0.048
(0.046)
-0.113
(0.162)
0.55***
(0.144)
1.499**
(0.623)

*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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Table 17 – Contagion K Nearest Neighbor Results Attempt
Coup Attempt
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

*

Attempt Contagion (K,R,4) 0.129
(0.076)
Attempt Contagion (K,B,4)

0.129*
(0.076)
0.129*
(0.076)

Attempt Contagion (K,V,4)

0.149*
(0.076)

Attempt Contagion (K,R,5)

0.149*
(0.076)

Attempt Contagion (K,B,5)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.427***
(0.082)
-0.048
(0.046)
-0.099
(0.161)
0.575***
(0.147)
1.505**
(0.623)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.427***
(0.082)
-0.048
(0.046)
-0.099
(0.161)
0.575***
(0.147)
1.505**
(0.623)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.427***
(0.082)
-0.048
(0.046)
-0.099
(0.161)
0.575***
(0.147)
1.505**
(0.623)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.426***
(0.081)
-0.049
(0.046)
-0.097
(0.161)
0.589***
(0.148)
1.506**
(0.622)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.426***
(0.081)
-0.049
(0.046)
-0.097
(0.161)
0.589***
(0.148)
1.506**
(0.622)

0.149*
(0.076)
-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.426***
(0.081)
-0.049
(0.046)
-0.097
(0.161)
0.589***
(0.148)
1.506**
(0.622)

6567.0
0.147
-1011.52
2041.04
2102.15

6567.0
0.147
-1011.52
2041.04
2102.15

6567.0
0.147
-1011.52
2041.04
2102.15

6567.0 6567.0
0.147
0.147
-1011.07 -1011.07
2040.15 2040.15
2101.26 2101.26

6567.0
0.147
-1011.07
2040.15
2101.26

Attempt Contagion (K,V,5)
Time Since
GDP pc(ln)
Military Exp (ln)
Democracy
Cold War
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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Table 18 – Contagion K Nearest Neighbors Results Success
Coup Attempt
(1)
Coup Contagion (K,R,4)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.102
(0.076)

Coup Contagion (K,B,4)

0.102
(0.076)

Coup Contagion (K,V,4)

0.102
(0.076)

Coup Contagion (K,R,5)

0.098
(0.077)

Coup Contagion (K,B,5)

0.098
(0.077)

Coup Contagion (K,V,5)
Time Since
GDP pc(ln)
Military Exp (ln)
Democracy
Cold War
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

(6)

-0.162***
(0.035)
-0.436***
(0.081)
-0.043
(0.047)
-0.101
(0.162)
0.548***
(0.144)
1.557**
(0.621)

-0.162***
(0.035)
-0.436***
(0.081)
-0.043
(0.047)
-0.101
(0.162)
0.548***
(0.144)
1.557**
(0.621)

-0.162***
(0.035)
-0.436***
(0.081)
-0.043
(0.047)
-0.101
(0.162)
0.548***
(0.144)
1.557**
(0.621)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.438***
(0.081)
-0.042
(0.047)
-0.097
(0.161)
0.549***
(0.145)
1.567**
(0.62)

-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.438***
(0.081)
-0.042
(0.047)
-0.097
(0.161)
0.549***
(0.145)
1.567**
(0.62)

0.098
(0.077)
-0.162***
(0.034)
-0.438***
(0.081)
-0.042
(0.047)
-0.097
(0.161)
0.549***
(0.145)
1.567**
(0.62)

6567.0
0.146
-1012.06
2042.13
2103.24

6567.0
0.146
-1012.06
2042.13
2103.24

6567.0 6567.0
0.146
0.146
-1012.06 -1012.14
2042.13 2042.29
2103.24 2103.39

6567.0
0.146
-1012.14
2042.29
2103.39

6567.0
0.146
-1012.14
2042.29
2103.39

*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:

147

APPENDIX C: FORECASTING AND COUPS

148

Table 19 – Feature Sources

Predictor
Time Since Coup

Operationalization Notes
Continuous - A count of years

Source
P&T

since last coup attempt
GDP/GDP Change

Penn World Table

GDP per capita/Change

Penn World Table

Regime Type

Democracy/Autocracy Binary and

Geddes Wright

13 Dummy indicators

and Frantz (2014)

Cold War

Binary Indicator

Year/Country FE

Binary Indicators

Military Expenditure/ Change

Continuous

Singer 1972

Military Expenditure per soldier/

Continuous

Singer 1972

Change
Civil Conflict

Binary - different thresholds. (high UCDP (Melander,
intensity = 1000 battle deaths a

Pettersson, and

year)

Themner 2016)
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Political Repression

Ordinal Scale - PTS

Population/Growth

Continuous

Penn World Table

Ethnic Fractionalization

Continuous

Historical Index of
Ethnic
Fractionalization
(Drazanova 2019)

Splines

Beck et. al 1998

REIGN Elections Data

Binary Indicators

REIGN 2016

Food Security indicators

Continuous

FAOStat

Coup Contagion

Continuous

Generated
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